




industrial security

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Vol. 3, No. 2

APRIL, 1959

OFFICIAL PUBLICATION
OF THE
**american society
for
industrial security**



U. S. ARMY ORDNANCE MISSILE COMMAND
ARMY BALLISTIC MISSILE AGENCY
REDSTONE ARSENAL, ALABAMA

IN REPLY
REFER TO

TO: The Members Of The American Society
For Industrial Security




During the last decade our technical advances in the field of rocketry and its related sciences have carried us into the Age of Space. Each day produces some new and exciting development. In an ideal world, it would be possible to reveal each development, each advance, immediately to all mankind.

Unfortunately, we are confronted by a powerful adversary whose capabilities, in the art of espionage and subversion, have probably never been equalled. Only an active security program supported by public opinion and a continued awareness by government and contractor personnel of the danger of relaxing our guard can make our research and development work meaningful.

Your organization should be proud of the great strides that you have made in developing an understanding in key government and industrial management officials of the need for the principles which you advocate. We Americans must never be allowed to forget that whenever we deal with classified information, our national defense is at stake.

May I take this opportunity of wishing the Society continued success in the year 1959. Your profession holds the future of the nation in its hands. Safeguard it well.

Sincerely,


WERNHER VON BRAUN
Director,
Development Operations Division

industrial security

Vol. 3, No. 2

APRIL, 1959

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
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The Use of Testing

IN THE SELECTION OF PLANT PROTECTION OFFICERS AND SECURITY GUARDS

By

ROBERT SHEEHAN

Assistant Professor, School of Police Administration
and Public Safety
Michigan State University

Recently, security representatives of one of our nations' largest corporations approached the School of Police Administration and Public Safety at Michigan State University with a personnel problem regarding selection of plant protection officers and security guards.

The School of Police Administration and Public Safety has long been concerned with the problem of who makes the best protection officer. The philosophy of the School holds that research to assist the working field is a function, duty and direct responsibility of its staff.

Through the efforts of Dr. Gwendolyn Norrell, Assistant Professor in charge of testing at the University's Counseling Center, a directed research project has been underway over the past five years in an effort to determine the best possible means of testing people planning to enter police and related areas in the career sense.

Although research is by no means completed on the project, there are indications that certain tests are useful in the selection of law enforcement personnel.

Because it was believed that other companies might have problems similar to the ones confronting the

security representatives of the corporation mentioned above, the writer felt that a general, informative article might be welcomed by the membership of the American Society for Industrial Security.

There are four factors with which a prospective employer should be concerned when considering the possibility of administering tests as a screening device. There are tests designed to probe the four factors. These tests are:

1. Intelligence
2. Personality
3. Interest
4. Deviancy

Tests in general, however, have been found by psychologists to be strictly *indications* to factors. They cannot be considered positive or final in any respect and should never be relied upon completely as a determination. They are indications and carry with them a wide possibility of chance and error.

Discussions of each of the four types of tests follow.

(Continued on page 28)

Industry and Non-Military Defense




By Virgil L. Couch, an authority on methods of planning and organizing for industrial survival in case of enemy attack or major natural disaster. He is Director, Industry Office, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization in the Executive Office of the President. Few men in the Nation today have his varied experience and background applicable to the key responsibility of civil defense in industry. He is a charter member of ASIS.

Security directors and supervisors who dedicate themselves to the protection of plant property and the survival of employees have been presented with a problem of staggering magnitude by the creation of new weapons and the threat of attack. Along with the rest of the management team, they must use all their knowledge and skill in meeting this problem.

While industrial survival planning is a job for the whole management team, the security director has an important role because his profession is concerned especially with safeguarding and securing employees, property and other corporate interests.

In reaching solutions to the problems of plant protection and survival of employees, many security executives have taken the lead in their companies by providing assistance to (1) achieve organizational capability for self-help and survival at the workplace, and to (2) inform and educate employees in methods of personal and home survival. To accomplish these objectives security directors and supervisors must be familiar with the nature and extent of national survival planning. They must know specifically what



to do in order to be prepared for enemy attack, major natural disaster or industrial accident, and be familiar with what other companies are doing in disaster planning and preparedness.

THE NATIONAL PLAN

The Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization is responsible for developing and promoting a national plan for the protection of life and property in this country during an enemy attack or other major disaster conditions. Such a plan has been developed and published. It is entitled "The National Plan for Civil Defense and Defense Mobilization."

It is a single document which establishes non-military courses of action, and the role of the Federal Government, the States, their political subdivisions, industry, and of individual citizens in the event of an attack to enable the Nation to survive, recover, and win.

It recognizes that differences between the free world and the communist world could require national actions to meet contingencies such as international tension, limited war, or general war.

(Continued on page 16)

Propaganda and Security —

Some Comparative Observations

by


TIMOTHY J. WALSH, Security Manager

Sperry Gyroscope Co., Div. of Sperry Rand Corp.

In the commendable effort to convince industrial employees of the integral importance of security to defense planning and procurement there has developed a body of communications — variously referred to as Security Education, Security Training or Security Orientation Programs — formidable in quantitative dimensions but in too many cases qualitatively inferior.

purity of purpose or enthusiasm will compensate for lack of skill in these vital respects.

Aware more than most of the delicate balance in world power and the grim resolution of our adversaries, the security officer sometimes feels that the sheer urgency of enlightened self protection will impress itself on Americans; that frequent reminders in the form of slogans, posters, lectures and the like



No matter how zealous its originator or manager may be, an effective campaign to inculcate positive attitudes towards security and to exploit attitudes by converting them into predictable behaviour patterns will not be achieved without advertence to and application of certain social science principles whose soundness and universality have already been demonstrated. Consistent, specific responses by mass audiences do not result from anything less than carefully planned, properly timed and psychologically valid motivation efforts, and no amount of ingenuous

will serve to keep the subject current and that from the interaction of these influences there will grow a mass willingness to do what is necessary. Regrettably no such synergistic result follows. People do not see and acknowledge the threat, they do not form strong resolves to combat it, and they do not spontaneously observe the precepts of industrial security. People, in short, will be people, reluctant to change, resentful of compulsion, disinterested in anyone else's problem unless they find themselves involved but, hap-

(Continued on page 42)

STOP THIEVES WITH "BLACK LIGHT!"




Ideal burglar protection for spacious areas at a reasonable cost, the transistorized Kidde Photo-Electric Burglar Alarm System uses an invisible beam of "black light," is completely tamper-proof, requires no special wiring. It can be installed simply and easily by one man. For more information about this new, U.L.-approved protection, send the coupon or write to Kidde today!

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The President's Page

Modern industrial management recognizes that the security administrator occupies an important and permanent place on the management team.

The present day industrial security administrator must be an able executive to cope with his responsibilities as a key representative of management. At the same time he must administer an effective security program that will be acceptable to individual employees because the participation of all personnel, as well as management, is a basic requirement for the success of any industrial security program.

The industrial security administrator should not only have a thorough knowledge of security, but he should also have general administrative ability as well as an aptitude for public and human relations, education, and salesmanship. These qualities, combined with initiative, adequate formal education, creative thinking, and an ability to find common sense solutions to difficult security problems, are among those successful security administrators possess.

There is no place in the modern industrial security system for security administrators who are prone to make arbitrary decisions, who without exception view everyone with suspicion, and who lack the common sense and good judgement to adapt their security program requirements to the needs of their industries.

One of the objectives of the American Society for Industrial Security is to make a major contribution to industrial management by assisting in the improvement of the administration of security. The Society is able to accomplish this by channeling the varied experiences, ideas, methods techniques and other factual data developed by security administrators across the country into a common storehouse of professional knowledge for use by the membership. In addition, efforts are constantly being made to raise the standards of professional security administrators through formal educational courses at recognized colleges and institutions, through research

programs, and through a variety of other techniques to benefit the individual.

The American Society for Industrial Security is well aware of its obligation to American industry and the responsibility it has assumed. The Society will continue its effort to better the administration of industrial security by improving the proficiency of the individual security administrator.

Richard J. Healy

Convention—North East Region


Mr. Ernest E. Felago, Vice President of the North-East Region, has announced that his Region, comprising all states from New Jersey through New England, will hold its first convention and exhibition in Rochester, New York beginning 8:30 a.m., on Friday, May 8, 1959, at the Manager Hotel.

Mr. Phil Wolz's Rochester Chapter will host this meeting.

A full day's program has been arranged with seminars on many of the subjects that deal with everyday problems of industry and business such as the 441 and 395 Programs, Property Loss Prevention, Fire and Disaster Control, Plant Protection, Safety, Employee Identification, etc. Personages from government and industry will actively participate in the program, including A. Gordon Patton, USAF; Capt. A. E. Shuman, ONM; Herbert Lewis, Staff Director, Industrial Personnel Security Review (OSD), and Col. M. Wilson, Chief, Security Division, Department of the Army.

There will be a dinner on May 8, 1959, with the Honorable John J. Grady, Deputy for Security Programs, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, Washington 25, D. C., as guest speaker.

Wives and friends are invited and a program will be ready for their enjoyment in the Rochester-Buffalo area.



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IN DECLASSIFICATION PROCEDURES



On February 3, 1959, Capt. K. Alfred Aho, (USN) gave a talk at a Washington, D. C. Chapter meeting. Capt. Aho is Director of Security BUARER; is a member of ASIS and has been designated as liaison officer between BUARER and ASIS.

The text of his talk follows:

Speaking from a Department of Defense viewpoint, our Industrial Security Program exists only because we have classified information. We, in the Industrial Security Program of the Department of Defense, have the responsibility of establishing and implementing policies, procedures and regulations concerned with the effective protection of classified information in the hands of United States Industry. Generally speaking, there are two major parts to this program, namely (1) classification of information, and (2) administrative procedures to protect this classified information.

In the administration of these responsibilities, the Bureau of Aeronautics receives its guidelines and instructions from the Secretary of Defense's Office through the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Naval Material. The basic regulations which govern our actions with United States Industry are: (1) the Industrial Security Manual (ISM), which applies to United States Industry, having Department of Defense classified contracts, and (2) the Armed Forces Industrial Security Regulation for Safeguarding Classified Information (AFISR), which applies to the military and is the Department of Defense counterpart to the Industrial Security Manual. These two basic regulations are pretty well known to most of you. It is emphasized, at this point, that these two regulations exist only because we have classified Department of Defense information.

So much for administration, the other major part of the Security Program is the responsibility of the Department of Defense to classify official information which requires protection in the interest of National Defense. It is this part of the program, which is established by Executive Order No. 10501, that we believe is actually the most important in the whole

Security Program. In this respect, we feel that classification policy has not received as much study in the individual Military Departments as it should have. It is for this reason that our office in the Bureau of Aeronautics has thoroughly examined the classification processes. Essentially, this was done to assure ourselves that our classification and regrading is accomplished in accordance with applicable current executive orders and Department of Defense policies.

It is well at this point to mention the Wright Commission, headed by Mr. Loyd Wright, which was established by the 84th Congress in 1956 to study the laws, executive orders, regulations, programs, practices and procedures intended for the protection of national security. In one of their studies, the classification policies of the Department of Defense, along with other government agencies, were investigated. As a result of this, the committee, in their report dated 21 June 1957, made many recommendations, one of which was to eliminate the Confidential classification. This recommendation was apparently made with the thought in mind that this action would eliminate a considerable amount of current and future Department of Defense classified information. My personal opinion is that this would be an unsound policy and probably would not appreciably reduce the amount of classified information.


An important recommendation along these lines was made however, which we in the bureau feel to be extremely useful; namely, that the Department of Defense establish a Classification Guide for Department of Defense and Industry use to identify classified information. If this recommendation was properly implemented, it is believed that needless classification and overclassification would be cut to an absolute minimum. It is also believed that this approach would reduce the amount of classified information more than the elimination of the Confidential classification.

The Secretary of Defense, in a separate action, established the Coolidge Committee in 1956, headed by the Honorable Charles A. Coolidge. Specifically, this committee was to study (1) the present laws, executive orders, and directives pertaining to classified information, (2) organizations and procedures to implement such regulations, (3) means available to the

(Continued on page 32)

**MISSILE
TRACKING**

SEA-LAB




This huge antenna is part of an electronic and optical system that RCA installed and is operating on the S.S. American Mariner. The purpose of the equipment, for which the ship has been refitted, is to provide the most precise data yet obtained at sea on missile flights over a range extending from Cape Canaveral, Fla., to the area of Ascension Island. The project is

sponsored jointly by the Advanced Research Projects Agency, Department of Defense and the Army Ordnance Command. A scientific staff—most of them RCA personnel—will operate the equipment and report on missile performance from descent from space to final plunge, the data to be shared by all branches of the armed services.



RADIO CORPORATION of AMERICA
DEFENSE ELECTRONIC PRODUCTS
CAMDEN, N. J.



Mr. F. E. Montfort, Director of Security, Consolidated Film Industries, Hollywood 38, Calif., is recognized as a foremost authority on Industrial Security matters as related to the Motion Picture Industry.



Formerly, Mr. Montfort was Chief, Security Division, Department of the Air Force assigned to the Hughes Aircraft Co., the Hughes Tool Co., both of Culver City, Calif., and the Rand Corp. of Santa Monica, California. During this tour of duty he was awarded numerous commendations for resolving problem areas in the field of classification and public release programs.

Prior to his present assignment, Mr. Montfort was associated as Manager, Industrial Security Division, Marquardt Aircraft Co., Van Nuys, California.

No one speaks. No other sound attempts to compete with the deafening roar of a missile inching upward. No sound, that is, except the soft whir of perhaps a dozen motion-picture cameras, recording the priceless data which will help make tomorrow's efforts even more effective than today's.

Amid the drama and tension of the launching pad, and in the purposeful quiet of hundreds of laboratories, motion picture film is playing a key role in the scientific progress on which our Nation's security depends.

The growth in the use of "movies" as a tool of modern science and technology has been extremely rapid during recent years. Millions of feet of classified film are being exposed every year, creating literally miles of security problems, for which adequate, uniform techniques and procedures are frequently lacking.

Consolidated Film Industries is an old and large film-processing laboratory; having grown with the motion-picture industry for the past forty years. With experienced personnel and extensive facilities avail-

able both in California and New York, it is only natural that CFI has continually been an important source of film processing for many highly classified defense projects. Since existing security guides are frequently inappropriate for film industries we have evolved our own procedures for safeguarding classified information on film.

Recognizing the great need for rapid dissemination of security know-how in this area, this article has been prepared in order to share some of the experience we have gained, and — perhaps even more important — with the hope of stimulating accelerated thought and action toward widespread adoption of more efficient and effective methods of safeguarding the security of classified motion-picture film.

Any organization — large or small — which is handling classified film, is faced with security problems of three kinds. Two of these are the matters of physical security and personnel education. While these are certainly important, they are not unique in the field of industrial security but are essentially the same as in other plants. The uncharted waters where trouble can most easily arise is in technical security . . . the actual handling of classified film.

The problem

What is so special about the handling of classified motion-picture film, as contrasted, say, with any other document? Broadly speaking, we find that potential security troubles arise from two sources: (1) mechanical, (2) psychological.

Mechanically, of course, the process of making a projectable piece of film is far more complex than producing a readable piece of paper. The film must pass through the hands of many specialists, and through many machines. It frequently must be mailed, shipped, or carried considerable distances in the

(Continued on page 36)



One is choice, the other isn't.

IT'S DIFFICULT TO TELL THE DIFFERENCE WITHOUT CLOSE INSPECTION

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The violin on the left is an 18th century German instrument, valued at \$50.00.

FACTS ABOUT PEOPLE



Developing Employee FIRE CONSCIOUSNESS

By

JOHN L. BRYAN,
Professor and Head,
Fire Protection
Curriculum

This is a paper prepared
for the Third Annual In-
dustrial Fire Protection
Short Course, University
of Maryland, College
Park, Maryland, February
3, 1959.



Let us take a good long look at this term "Fire Consciousness", and attempt to understand just what this term implies. An explicit explanation might be, "the process by which persons are made conscious of the dangers and hazards of fire". Now, using this explanation you will notice that the key point is "the process", the process by which persons are made conscious of the dangers, and hazards of fire. The basic feature of any such process by which people adapt, involves the *attitude* and the *mode of perception*.

of the person. By developing "fire consciousness", we really mean developing in our employees an attitude, an awareness of the dangers of fire, not as it relates to the United States, not as it relates to the Company, but as it relates to each and every employee. The question thus becomes — How do we relate our information on fire to the employee in the plant in a meaningful manner? We are attempting to change the attitude and to modify the be-

(Continued on page 39)

THE
GLOBE

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Virgil L. Couch (Continued)

The Director, Office of Civil Defense Mobilization, Governor Leo A. Hoegh, has stated, "The National Plan has been developed through conferences with governors, mayors, State and local civil defense officials, advisory committees, and agencies of the Federal Government. It provides the Federal leadership, direction, coordination, and guidance necessary for an effective civil defense and defense mobilization in this Nation.



One of two main rooms in underground center at Pratt & Whitney Aircraft division's communications system. Large, well lighted and ventilated room includes all sending and receiving equipment. The facility also has four rooms which serve as control points during alerts, are normally used for lecture rooms for civil defense volunteers in first aid and plant protection.

The facility is underground and contains about 1,700 feet of floor space. Pratt & Whitney Aircraft is a division of United Aircraft and is located in East Hartford, Conn.

"The Plan projects the non-military defense of the Nation 10 years into the future. It emphasizes immediate survival under attack, and subsequent recovery. It anticipates progressive changes in weapons and in defenses against them."

"If war should come despite our efforts to secure peace, an effective application of this Plan will surely save tens of millions of lives that could otherwise be lost."

Upon issuance of the National Plan for Civil Defense and Defense Mobilization, President Eisenhower stated, "It is the clear and unequivocal position of the United States that conflict and disagreement among nations should not be resolved by the use of force. The United States will continue through all available channels to attempt resolution of disagreements by all means that will allow peace with honor. Nevertheless, so long as direct or indirect aggression is used as an instrument of national policy by any nation, common prudence requires that every effort be made to protect the people of the United States by both active and passive means of defense. Civil Defense and Defense

Mobilization are vital parts of the Nation's total defense."

Within the Plan it is made clear that *industry* has certain definite responsibilities in supporting the common defense, such as, "The leaders of industry, agriculture, labor and financial institutions are responsible, in cooperation with appropriate government agencies, for planning and executing measures designed to assure the continued functioning, or rapid restoration to functioning, of the essential elements of the national economy."

Several nations have the capability of destroying or gravely wounding one another with nuclear weapons. It is a fact that any nation in the world can be attacked. It is now possible for one airplane to deliver in a single sortie many times the explosive equivalent of the entire bombing effort of the Allied Forces in World War II. Intercontinental ballistic and other guided missiles soon may make it possible to deliver nuclear bombs with speed dwarfing that of the modern airplane. A comparatively few such weapons dropped on this country could destroy or cripple our economy. The use of nuclear weapons in military operations could do the same to our military support.

A bombing attack on this nation's industries would result in immediate retaliation by our armed forces. The difference between victory and defeat could well depend on which country could resume production first. Our defense planners feel that weeks, or even days, could be decisive in the fight for victory and survival in a nuclear war.

Unquestionably, industry, its factories, and its workers would be a target of enemy bombers. Unless through proper protective measures the effects of that first all-out attack can be blunted, our key industrial concentrations could be crippled so badly that we might lose a war before production could be resumed. This means that industry must prepare to survive an attack—prepare for civil defense.

WHAT IS CIVIL DEFENSE?

An erroneous impression has gone forth that civil defense is an organization which is established separate from local government and that such organization would confront an emergency caused by enemy attack, *only* with an army of volunteers decked out in tin hats and civil defense arm bands. Nothing could be further from the truth.

The FCDA Act of 1950 defines the term "civil defense" as "... All those activities and measures designed or undertaken to *minimize the effects* upon the civilian population caused or which would be *caused by an attack* upon the United States . . ."

All activities, therefore, which tend to "minimize the effects upon the civilian population caused or which would be caused by an attack upon the United States" are *civil defense activities*.

(Continued on page 18)

Motivation Productions, Inc.

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Mr. R. J. Healy, President
American Society For Industrial Security
431 Investment Building
Washington, D.C.

Dear Dick:

This is by way of saying "thanks -- to you, and to the many ASIS members whose help and encouragement have meant so much...to the company, and to me personally.

The job we're trying to do is a tough one that others have failed at in the past. I firmly believe that our present effectiveness is due in large part, to the courteous cooperation extended to me by individual ASIS members, as well as by the chapters whose meetings I have been privileged to attend.

Our business is selling posters and other security training aids. But our job, as we see it, is to make those materials available, at realistic prices, to people in the field who really need them. Meetings with many of those people have provided me with considerable knowledge of the field and of the needs that we're trying to meet. (For example, our posters are priced to reflect a widely expressed belief in a need for "Madison avenue-type posters that can be bought for a buck." Judging by their acceptance, we have been successful in tailoring our posters to meet this particular need.) There's a long way still to go, but it's beginning to look as if we may eventually get there!

We would like to extend an invitation to ASIS members to forward any inquiries about audio-visual training materials. We won't guarantee to answer all questions, but we'll be happy to pass along any ideas that may be helpful. The reason for this offer is a belief that an informal service of this nature is an integral part of the job we're trying to do. We hope your people will take advantage of it. Again, many thanks, and best personal regards to you and those members of the Society, including our subscribers, who have extended a helping hand.

Cordially,

MOTIVATION PRODUCTIONS, INC.

/s/Sherman Beck

Sherman Beck
President

—Advertisement—

Virgil L. Couch (Continued)

Civil defense—the only kind of civil defense that will pay off—concerns the responsibility of each level of government to deal with emergencies as they arise. Suppose your home town were hit by a tornado, a flood, or some other form of natural disaster. The town fathers would not stand idle while squads of volunteers rushed helter-skelter into the fray. Rather, the mayor, police chief and other officials would employ all of their resources to cope with the situation. Of course, they would use volunteers. But, *such volunteers would serve as auxiliaries to the departments of local government and under the direction of local government. They would be a part of local government.*

And, if the disaster were big enough, your home town could expect help from the State and, if necessary, from all pertinent agencies of the Federal Government. That is government in emergency action—the only real form of civil defense.

WHAT SHOULD INDUSTRY DO TO PREPARE FOR SURVIVAL?

Many industrial organizations already have taken certain disaster precautions. However, every industry must work continually on plans to overcome production interruptions due to attack damage. There is no question but that this work must be broadened and intensified.

It is clear that there can be no one plan which will meet the requirements of all companies and plants. However, with information gathered from Hiroshima and Nagasaki, from the A-bomb and H-bomb tests, and from the thinking of many industrial executives who have already made certain disaster preparations within their companies and plants, we can suggest certain elements of a survival program which can be tailored to fit each company and plant situation.

What are some of the typical actions which industrial management can take to minimize the effects of attack—to protect the domestic mobilization base and give greater assurance of production continuity? In general these may be classified as actions for (1) protecting life and property, (2) preserving the corporate structure and (3) promoting the industrial survival program.

GUIDES TO PROTECTING LIFE AND PROPERTY IN INDUSTRIAL PLANTS

1. GET IN TOUCH WITH THE LOCAL CIVIL DEFENSE DIRECTOR. It is his job to provide guidance and assistance, and to coordinate the emergency planning activities among the various departments of local government. This includes also the development of plans to utilize fully and coordinate the non-government leadership and resources into community emergency preparedness. Continual liaison with local civil defense officials and other departments

of local government must be maintained to ensure proper coordination. Up-to-date emergency planning information, guidance, and assistance should be available to you from your local civil defense director and emergency planners in the various departments of local government.

2. ESTABLISH COMPANY AND PLANT LEADERSHIP RESPONSIBILITY FOR DISASTER PREPAREDNESS. The first step in the actual preparation for disaster is the appointment of a *single individual* at both the company level and in each plant—a *disaster planning or civil defense coordinator*—to provide coordination and direction of the overall corporate disaster plan and the disaster plan in each plant.

Second, at both the company and plant level *a disaster or civil defense advisory committee* should be designated representing various departments of the company, to assist in the development of the various phases of the disaster planning or civil defense program.

Third, issue appropriate policy statements and administrative directives to establish the disaster control program.

It is imperative that coordinators and committee members maintain close liaison with civil defense officials. They should become thoroughly familiar with the authority, organization, and emergency procedures which are established by law and become effective upon declaration of an emergency by the President or Congress.

Coordinators, committee members, and service chiefs may obtain valuable information and training by attending the OCDM Staff College course in "Industry Defense and Mobilization" at Battle Creek, Michigan, and other OCDM courses such as Rescue and Radiological Defense. A great variety of publications also are available.

(Continued on page 20)



A section of the Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation security vaults showing part of the company's more than 12,000 emergency storage files located underground and many miles from a target area.

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IF YOU'RE LOOKING FOR FIRE-AND-THEFT-RESISTANT FILES for classified material, these Herring-Hall-Marvin INSULATED files with manipulation-proof Group 1 combination lock are your answer. They are certified by the Standardization Division of General Services Administration to comply with test requirements of Interim Federal Specification AA-F-00357a for a Class 2 cabinet.

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BRANCH OFFICES IN: Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Dallas, Denver, Detroit, Houston, Kansas City,
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Virgil L. Couch (Continued)

3. ORGANIZE AND TRAIN EMPLOYEES FOR SELF-HELP. Self-help or self-protection is the concept of training each employee, and organizing and training small groups of employees, within and among industrial plants, large buildings and other facilities for specialized emergency services, such as fire-fighting, rescue, police, first-aid, and radiological monitoring, to safeguard the building and its occupants in time of attack or other major disaster. The framework of an effective disaster control or self-help organization is already in existence in most large buildings and industrial plants. For example, most plants already have organized and trained fire brigades, guard services, rescue teams, first-aid and welfare groups. In order to be prepared for self-help the problem is simply one of enlarging and extending already organized groups, with the addition of perhaps a few teams concerned with radiological monitoring and rescue.

These specialized groups can serve as auxiliaries to the various departments of local government, that is, police, fire, health, radiological defense, etc. Therefore, by enlargement and extension of normal industrial emergency protective groups, and their enrollment as auxiliaries to the various protective forces of local government, we will achieve a "built-in" community capability for quick action in an emergency.



Offices such as this one at the National Storage Company, 220 feet below ground, in solid rock, will provide protection for company records and serve as company emergency headquarters in case of attack. Complete living accommodations have been constructed at this underground location.

We believe that any plant is capable of organizing for its own self-protection provided that management supplies leadership and a chain of command for emergency planning and emergency action.

All planning, training and test exercises should be conducted in cooperation with community officials — the Mayor and civil defense director, and other local government department heads.

All employees should be trained in self-help methods, including fire-fighting, rescue, first-aid and radiological defense. When employees are informed and trained in emergency procedures, under management leadership at the workplace, there is a vital by-product of "take-home training" and information which is helpful also in accomplishing survival preparedness in the home.

4. ESTABLISH A PLANT WARNING AND COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM. Arrangements should be made to receive the air raid warning and to disseminate it quickly to employees throughout the plants. Where buildings are spread over a wide area or located beyond hearing distance of a community warning, a separate warning system may be necessary. In many instances the existing public address system can be used. However, the warning system must be adequate to reach all office buildings, plants, laboratories, and all other places where employees are located.


A control room should be set up with communications to the nearest civil defense control center and to other plants in the community which are in mutual aid associations. It is especially important for the plant civil defense coordinator to be acquainted with the situation in order to use effectively all resources at his command during an emergency and to coordinate the activities of the different self-help services, and to check resources. A control center is useful in peace-time disaster such as fire or explosion when damage occurs simultaneously at several points, and is vital during an enemy attack. Even a small plant should have a communications control system.

5. DEVELOP EMERGENCY SHUT-DOWN PROCEDURES. Orderly and speedy shut-down in industrial plants is vital in time of emergency. Whether simply pulling a switch, closing a valve, or cooling a large furnace, all must be planned for in advance. This is true also in office buildings and institutions. In large buildings explosive gas fumes, high voltage lines, fire, and similar hazards can be just as deadly as natural forces or military weapons.

In some instances, due to the manufacturing processes, disorderly shut-down could result in self-destruction of the plant — destruction as great as that resulting from an attack. Procedures must be planned and tested. Mock shut-down training exercises are conducted regularly in many plants.

6. PLAN FOR EVACUATION OF INDUSTRIAL PLANTS. Movement of civilians from dangerous and potentially dangerous areas in time of civil defense emergency requires thorough organization, timing, and supervision. Great confusion can result from the spontaneous and rapid movement of employees when not properly directed. A rendezvous point must be

(Continued on page 22)



TOP: Non-toxic, non-caustic foam stream of extreme consistency extends more than 200 feet from apparatus effectively to provide safe foam path into a fire.

LOWER LEFT: Completely compatible dry-powder and foam streams, supported by the powerful protective cover from the turret's foam stream, effectively extinguished in 11 seconds an 850 gallon JP-4 simulated jet airplane crash in a recent test.

A New Concept Is Applied To An Old Principle

SPACE Corporation announces the development of a chemical foam system specifically designed for high-intensity fires. Complete volume, time-in-operation, and distance control is possible for the first time with this apparatus.

Pictured above, mounted on a Ford C-600 chassis, the system can be installed on any kind of vehicle chosen by the user, or it can be trailer or skid mounted for perfect application to all types of work ranging from incidental blazes to major industrial fires.



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MEMBER OF AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR INDUSTRIAL SECURITY

Virgil L. Couch (Continued)

designated at a safe distance from the plant and arrangements made to provide shelter and care for employees. A general traffic plan, both within and outside the plant, must be made, directional and other information signs and instructions posted, and adequate transportation provided. *All evacuation planning must be done in cooperation with local government officials.*

It should be kept in mind that we will *never* have definite assurance of a *specific amount of warning time*. Therefore, we must be able to move fast when it is clear that there is sufficient time for evacuation.

7. PROVIDE SHELTERS FOR EMPLOYEES. If there is not sufficient warning time to evacuate the plant, the only alternative is to take shelter. There is still need for shelter from blast, radiation, and heat effects on the fringe areas of damage.

Industries should designate areas within the plant where employees may be protected from the effects of an attack. Build deeper and stronger-walled basements, with thicker and stronger first-floor slabs, or construct separate underground shelters. Provide emergency power and sanitation facilities and filtered ventilation. A two week's supply of food, water, and emergency medical supplies should be available in shelter areas.

8. ESTABLISH A PLANT SECURITY SYSTEM FOR PREVENTION OF SABOTAGE AND ESPIONAGE. Sabotage is an effective means of attack. Therefore, industry should take appropriate measures to prevent the commission by misguided persons or enemy agents of any destructive act to impair the productive ability of the plant. Measures also are needed to prevent the collection of information which might contribute to the enemy's knowledge of the Nation's war potential. Such information might be used to advantage by an enemy in attacking this country either through direct or covert means.

Protective measures include adequate guard or watchman services, fencing, protective lighting, investigation of applicants and employees, pass and identification systems, safeguarding classified information and proper reports to the FBI of suspicion of sabotage, espionage or subversion.

9. PROVIDE EMERGENCY PROTECTION FROM DELAYED OR UNCONVENTIONAL WEAPONS EFFECTS. Clandestine and unexploded ordnance are hazards which must be dealt with promptly. Organization and training must insure prompt reporting to state and local forces which will conduct reconnaissance for unexploded ordnance and report the existence of such ordnance to the closest Department of Defense Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit or ZI-Army Commander through the OCDM

Regional Director. State and local authorities will provide for restriction of areas and protection of persons from such ordnance, including execution of plans for evacuation to safer areas, until arrival of the responsible explosive ordnance personnel. The Federal Bureau of Investigation will investigate reported incidents of clandestinely-introduced weapons. The De-



Emergency supplies and equipment, including cots and blankets, stored by the Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation at one of the company's emergency headquarters areas for use in event of disaster.

partment of Defense, through its Explosive Ordnance Disposal Units, will disarm atomic weapons and dispose of other unexploded weapons. The Atomic Energy Commission will take custody and dispose of fissionable materials of unexploded ordnance.

10. PARTICIPATE IN INDUSTRIAL MUTUAL-AID ASSOCIATIONS FOR EMERGENCY. This type association is an organization of a group of industrial plants or utilities in an area or community, united by a reciprocal agreement and a communication system to provide assistance to each other in disaster in the form of equipment and personnel.

Although industrial mutual aid associations are not new, the idea is especially applicable to civil defense for dealing with wartime and natural disaster problems.

Few plants can provide all the services and equipment needed in time of disaster. By joining up with other large facilities in the neighborhood and through proper coordination with departments of local government, assistance can be provided to one another in the form of equipment, materials or personnel in time of disaster.

GUIDES TO PLANNING FOR PRESERVATION OF THE CORPORATE STRUCTURE.

1. PLAN FOR CONTINUITY OF EACH MAJOR CORPORATE FUNCTION. The enlarged aspects of industrial defense planning must involve practically

every department head in a company; the security officer, the purchasing agent, the treasurer and controller, the personnel director, the general counsel, the secretary, the production manager, the chief engineer, the head of research and, of course, the Board of Directors. Each department head must examine the functions for which he is responsible in peacetime and work out answers to problems involving continuity during and following attack. Unquestionably, many peacetime functions would become unnecessary while some would become extremely complicated and vitally necessary.

2. ASSIGN EMERGENCY FUNCTIONS TO EACH EMPLOYEE. A severe emergency may in a short time convert an existing peacetime organization into quite a different type of organization structure with altered or expanded functions. Such drastic changes inevitably mean that some groups of employees will become surplus at the same time that other units urgently need more workers. A systematic placement and transfer plan may prove of great value under such conditions. Likewise, plans should be made for quick emergency employee training, revised salary and wage administration, hours of work, protection of the retirement system and union relations.


3. PLAN FOR CONTINUITY OF MANAGEMENT. For each key position, replacements should be designated in order of succession. Thus the surviving person highest on the list could assume temporary direction of the position following attack. This is an important part of disaster planning. No company is better than the people who make it work. If a company or plant is to continue production during and following attack, its key jobs must be filled.

Leadership needed for continuation of production after an attack could become virtually non-existent, unless plans are made prior to an attack for lines of succession. Preservation of managerial skill must be a major part of the disaster control and civil defense planning.


4. AMEND BY-LAWS AND ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS. Appropriate authorization is often necessary to act in event of emergency. Each function of the various offices and departments of the company should be reviewed to determine whether the function should be continued in wartime, and alternate solutions listed. By-Laws should be amended to provide authorizations for reestablishing the company and

(Continued on next page)

GATE GUARDING EFFICIENCY



High turnstile control




Low turnstile control

Perey Turnstiles-

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Submit your problem to our application engineers



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Virgil L. Couch (Continued)

continuing production under conditions caused by attack disaster.

5. ESTABLISH ALTERNATE CORPORATE AND PLANT HEADQUARTERS. If continuity of management is to be effective, managers must have a place to assemble and work which is equipped and furnished for carrying on corporate operations during and after attack. It is desirable that such a headquarters be at a point where the company already has an installation. However, it should not be in a critical target area. It should be equipped with communications systems and living quarters.

6. DESIGNATE EMPLOYEE REPORTING CENTERS. Additional or secondary emergency reporting points should be established for all personnel. Some companies have set up reporting centers at the homes of executive personnel who reside in suburban areas. Certain records are maintained at these locations and arrangements have been made for priority telephone service in an emergency. The cost of this type of planning is insignificant when compared with the activities of recovery-planning which can be conducted at these locations during or after the emergency. A few companies have stored "disaster checks" which may be given to employees who report to these centers following an attack, as a source of funds until the plant can resume production.

7. PROTECT VITAL INDUSTRIAL RECORDS AND DOCUMENTS. Protection of vital records includes the duplication and safe storage of records important to the continuation of the company and plant production. It is important that written descriptions of activities, manufacturing processes, engineering designs, and vital legal documents and accounting records be preserved and available to management after an attack.

One firm has described the disabling results of a loss of vital records as "corporate amnesia". Records protection is one of the easiest concrete precautions a company can take and might well be among first steps in disaster planning.

8. DEVELOP EMERGENCY FINANCIAL PROCEDURES. Money may be needed promptly following attack for wage payment, cash advances to employees, payment of bills, and purchase of survival items such as medicines, food, and equipment. Some companies maintain bank accounts of an unrestricted nature at scattered locations and have established lines of credit at a variety of places.

Emergency procedures for drawing company funds should be developed in advance. Banking arrangements should be adequate and corporate by-laws should have ample provisions for withdrawal of funds. A list of depositories in which the company has its

funds should be kept current and on file in the company record storage vaults. In some instances it may be desirable to deposit a small amount of cash at the alternate company headquarters and in each of the security storage vaults.

9. PLAN FOR EMERGENCY REPAIR AND RESTORATION. An important part of disaster planning, this consists of activities necessary to assess and repair damage and restore communications, services, power, and production quickly. It includes the organization and training of special groups for repair of the industrial plant itself and the restoration of electric, communication, gas and water services.

10. DECONCENTRATE CRITICAL PRODUCTION. When production of essential items is concentrated geographically, an inviting target is offered to the enemy for inflicting the greatest amount of industrial injury in a given attack. Deconcentration refers to the geographic decentralization of critical production so that all manufacture of a critical item is not in one location.

Planning should provide not only relocation of the key production of critical items to other plants in other geographical areas but also relocation of key departments of critical plant or facility, including the management and technical office.

11. DISPERSE NEW INDUSTRIAL PLANTS. Obviously, the best defense method for protecting our domestic mobilization base and ensuring survival is industrial dispersion. This is the employment of the simple military measure of using space and topography for defense of industrial plants against attack. Adequate dispersion will create a multiplicity of targets and reduce the relative vulnerability of any one concentration of industrial production. In addition to dispersal of production, it is evident that certain finished items, especially materials necessary for survival, be dispersed and available for immediate use following attack.

12. PREPARE TO REPORT DAMAGE QUICKLY. Early and comprehensive assessment of damage caused by attack is vital to quick recovery. Each level of government will design, construct and maintain in operating condition systems capable of providing rapid and reasonably accurate estimates of (1) the anticipated and existing location and degree of attack effects, especially radiological contamination and (2) what has survived the attack and is useful for recovery. Industrial managements will be expected to cooperate fully in reporting as required to local authorities the nature and extent of damage to their plants. Decentralized and dispersed multi-plant corporations will need to receive such information also at their emergency company headquarters.

(Continued on page 26)

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
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For additional information on these modern new uniforms of "Dacron"**, write to E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. (Inc.), Nemours Building, 5527, Wilmington 98, Delaware. (Industrial Security).

Name

Address

City Zone State

Virgil L. Couch (Continued)

GUIDES TO PROMOTING THE COMPANY INDUSTRIAL SURVIVAL PLAN.

1. PREPARE CORPORATE AND PLANT DISASTER PLAN MANUALS. Put the corporate and plant civil defense plans in writing. Describe the purpose of the plans and the nature and responsibilities of each protective service, list the team leaders and members, outline the emergency procedures for each leader and team, show floor plans with shelter locations and evacuation routes.

The Disaster plan should be furnished to executives and members of the protective and self-help groups. The manual could serve as a guide for periodically reviewing and up-dating the plan.

2. TELL EMPLOYEES ABOUT THE DISASTER PLAN. Handbooks should be prepared containing basic information regarding the company plan and information necessary for self-protection at the workplace, including description of the Alert Warning Signals, floor plan drawings showing shelter areas and hazardous points within the plant, maps showing evacuation movement routes within the plant and to safe areas outside the city. Such information should be given to all employees.

3. TEST THE PLAN. Conduct periodic exercises and drills. Management personnel should go to the emergency headquarters and practice working under simulated wartime emergency. All plant employees

should practice evacuation and taking cover. The national civil defense exercises, such as "Operation Alert" and "Civil Defense Day" provide excellent opportunity to cooperate with local government in testing communications systems and survival plans in plants and office buildings.

4. URGE EMPLOYEES TO PREPARE THEIR FAMILIES AND HOMES FOR WARTIME EMERGENCY AND NATURAL DISASTER. One of the most effective ways to reach people with survival information is where they work. This is where the message takes on real meaning, for if the message to the individual is to be consistent it must be practiced where he finds himself. In other words, if the individual is to be prepared, *he must be prepared in his home as well as at his workplace.*

As a part of the program for informing and educating employees in methods of personnel and home survival, each employee should be provided with a wallet-size card, which is available from local civil defense offices, containing brief instructions regarding the alert warning signals and what to do.

Civil defense publications such as "Home Protection Exercises" and other appropriate manuals are available from local government offices. These publications should be given to employees with an appropriate letter from management urging them to make disaster plans at home. This is not only important in survival planning but is a vital service to the community. Employees should be familiar with the neighborhood survival plan and be ready to help, should an attack occur while they are at home.

5. UTILIZE EMPLOYEE PUBLICATIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS. Information regarding emergency preparedness techniques should be included as a regular department in employee publications and as a regular feature of employee meetings.

6. TELL STOCKHOLDERS ABOUT THE COMPANY DISASTER PROGRAM. Some companies have included information regarding the company civil defense plan in the regular quarterly and annual reports to stockholders, and have urged stockholders to cooperate with local government in serving as auxiliaries and in preparing their homes and families for disaster.

7. TELL THE PUBLIC THAT YOU HAVE MADE PLANS FOR WARTIME EMERGENCY AND DISASTER CONTROL IN YOUR COMPANY AND IN EACH PLANT. Industrial and business employers occupy a position of prestige and influence in the community. If it is known that private industry and business are making plans for disaster, then individuals at home will be motivated to make like plans. Some companies have included information regarding their civil defense plans in advertisements, radio announcements and TV skits.



Bob A. Meador, San Francisco Air Procurement District, member of the Northern California Chapter A.S.I.S. is shown receiving a pin and plaque from Mr. John D. McWethy, Manager, Joint Airlines Military Ticket Office, Oakland, California. Bob has traveled over 200,000 air miles and has been an active recruiter for A.S.I.S. at every stop. He recently returned from Hawaii where he spoke with twenty-six prospective members.

8. **SUPPORT AND ASSIST THE COMMUNITY SURVIVAL PLANNING EFFORTS.** Many industrial and business executives are serving as volunteer civil defense directors, volunteer leaders of fire, rescue and police auxiliaries and reserve units. Some firms have sponsored radio and TV programs urging citizens to prepare for disaster. Some have sponsored specially prepared movies and publications as a means of furthering the objectives of emergency preparedness.

CONCLUSION

These are, in the main, some of the most important steps which must be taken by industry in order to survive an attack. Because of the nature of their peace-time duties Industrial security executives must play also a vital role in preparing for civil defense and disaster control.

No one plan will fit all conditions. Too much emphasis cannot be given to the importance of basing the company disaster plans on the conditions and factors which make up the local situation. Industrial security directors and supervisors must recognize, therefore, that the steps and guides suggested here can only provide general assistance in planning, and that specific plans for each company and each plant must be built upon careful analysis of the local situation.

tion and upon the creativity, imagination, and common sense of the local planners.

We must take steps now to protect the lives of employees, protect the plant property and preserve the corporate structure of each industrial firm as a means of insuring continuity of production and national survival. *This kind of emergency disaster and control planning must be a normal part of the everyday activities of all industrial firms so long as we are faced with the threat of attack.* When such plans are made at the workplace and coordinated with local government, we will have achieved a strong "built-in" community capability to deal with the unusual problems caused by enemy attack or other major disaster; and government leadership will have been strengthened to save life and property and insure the continuity of production and continuity of government.

Time is not unlimited. Each year, each month that passes without steps being taken to provide adequate non-military defense in industry and to insure the restoration and preservation of our national economy should attack occur, adds to the practical difficulty of achieving *national security*.

Make industrial security and emergency plans now! After the bombs fall it will be too late!

MAXIMUM SECURITY

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Testing (Continued)

THE INTELLIGENCE TEST

Intelligence tests are designed to measure mental capacity level. Commonly referred to as IQ tests, they numerically categorize the individual taking the test. We thus refer to people who have IQ's of 75, 95, 110, 140, etc.

There are two intelligence tests which are highly recommended. These are the *Otis Mental Ability* and the *Wonderlic Personnel Test*. Each test measures for basic capacities.

For work as a protection officer or security guard, it is advisable that the applicant have an IQ level of from 90 to 110. This is average intelligence. Anyone above or below this range would generally be considered unsuitable for the work.

An individual below the 90 level would not have the mental capacity to perform tasks required of him in a field as dynamic as the protection field.

A person with an IQ above the 110 maximum would in all probability be a misfit in protection work. His

Although a man could not be eliminated from consideration if he did not fall within the intelligence continuum suggested, the test, if properly administered, would at least be a strong indication that the man is not qualified in terms of intelligence.

THE PERSONALITY TEST

Personality tests are designed to measure the personality traits an individual possesses. Examples of personality traits would be aggressiveness, achievement, endurance, heterosexuality, masculinity, femininity, socialization, personal relations, nurturance, abasement, emotional stability and general activity level. These are but a few of the major traits or characteristics examined by personality tests.

The person taking the test is categorized in respect to the factors which occur most frequently.

Here, once again, only an indication or inference may be drawn from the test results. The test might indicate, for example, the possibility that a person is overly aggressive or that he is emotionally unstable. In considering this individual for employment as a

Representatives of area industries confer at the recent organization meeting of the Binghamton, N. Y., Chapter, American Society for Industrial Security. Left to right seated: Clarence H. Sackey, Anasco, Binghamton; Ernest E. Felago, regional ASIS vice-president, New York City; Raymond DeWolfe, GE Johnson City plant, chapter chairman; Merville L. Mitchell, IBM Endicott, chapter vice-chairman; and Kenneth J. Lewis, IBM Endicott. Standing: H. Lee Baker, Link Aviation, Binghamton; George G. Gaydos, Ozalid, Johnson City; Roland L. Loomis, Westinghouse Corp., Elmira, chapter secretary-treasurer; Richard Dunbar, Bendix Corp., Elmira; Richard Jones, GE Ithaca; George A. Hauser, Clean-It, Inc., Endwell; Paul Whitaker, IBM Owego; John Zimmer, Rochester Air Procurement District, USAF; and William Jewett, Endicott Johnson Corp., Johnson City.



capacity level, being above average or significantly above average, places him in a position where he might easily become bored with his work to the point where he would look elsewhere for challenge. The everyday humdrum activity would soon become unbearable and the man involved would fast become lazy, useless, dissatisfied, and ambitious in terms of other things and other jobs which he can never reach as a protection officer. More important than these considerations perhaps is his influence on the morale of those around him. One overly intelligent security guard can ruin an entire force.

protection officer, the employer should exhibit extreme care in exploring the possibility that the applicant does actually possess these traits.

Two excellent personality tests are the *Edwards' Personal Preference Profile* and the *Gilford-Zimmerman Temperament Survey*.

Through the personality test, it is possible to get an indication as to whether or not the person being tested is, for example, overly ambitious in respect to the job for which he is being considered.

The person who is especially ambitious does not

make a good protection officer because of the poor adjustment he will inevitably make to a position which has a limited future and potential.

If, through intelligence and personality tests, it is determined that the tests indicate superior intelligence as well as aggressiveness and ambition the employer should be doubly cautious when considering the applicant.

Each one of the personality traits should be considered individually as it relates to the position open in the security or protection department. Each trait should be considered, once again, only as an indication.

THE INTEREST TEST

Interest tests, as implied, are designed as means of determining interest as it relates to approximately forty different job areas. The tests are generally referred to as interest inventories.

Policemen usually indicate a preference for the social service area as would doctors, social workers and clergymen. Security guards and protection officers should fall within this same general category.

The most highly recommended interest inventory is the *Strong Vocational Interest Test*. Although there are many other similar tests available, the Strong test is by far the best indicator; no other test ap-

proaches it in terms of validity and accuracy. The *Kuder Preference Record CM* would, however, be acceptable where testing funds were limited.

Again, the interest test serves only as an indication. However, the results of the three types of tests combined now begin to establish a *strong* indication.

THE DEVIANCY TEST

Admittedly, it would be extremely desirable if a test could be administered which would indicate the deviant and separate them from the normal. To date, no such test exists.

The *Minnesota-Multiphasic*, one of the many personality inventories available, has enjoyed a large degree of success but only in terms of an abnormal sample. It has been standardized on a psychotic population and therefore has no application to the normal person being considered for employment.

A determination concerning indication of deviancy, therefore, cannot be determined through testing.

DEVELOPING A COMPANY TESTING PROGRAM

Many large corporations have facilities available to administer and interpret the tests suggested. Where these facilities are not available on a company basis, there are testing services in major cities throughout the country which are entirely capable of handling a given project.


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Testing (Continued)

It should be clearly understood that unless a test is administered and interpreted by trained personnel, the test is useless. Competent people necessarily must be utilized and consulted even when considering the possibility of establishing a testing program within an organization.

A program may be developed for administering and interpreting standardized tests such as the ones mentioned in this article.

It is also possible to develop a specialized company testing program which could easily be devised to particularly test for the unique and specialized skills demanded by the particular operation. In developing such a program, it would be necessary to poll a sample of protection officers working for the company through a given test and correlate the results of the poll with a supervisory rating scale given to supervisors at the same time the test is administered to the sample.

This would make it possible to develop within each company a testing program adapted to the peculiarities of the particular and specialized operation. The validity of the tests administered could thus be established in terms of company supervisory desirability and need, determined through a statistical correlation.

INTERVIEWS

Throughout this article, emphasis has been placed upon the fact that a test alone is not enough to determine whether or not a person is suitable for a position as a plant protection officer. The test is an indication. It can never be anything else.

The indication, determined by the test, must be thoroughly investigated. One method of investigation, considered here as a part of the testing procedure, takes the form of an interview preferably handled by a board of at least three people.

The three people comprising the board should be thoroughly experienced in interviewing technique.

The best type of interview as a testing follow-up is the so-called *stress* interview in which the person being interviewed is asked questions which place him in a position where he is under a considerable emotional strain. Much can be determined by a skilled interview board in the stress situation; this is particularly so in cases where the interview board is armed with test results which indicate intelligence, personality and interest.

In a case, for example, where tests indicate that a person is dominant, questions may be asked which will conclusively show whether or not this is so. Similarly, if ambition is indicated, the subject of the interview might well be asked the question, "How much money would you like to be making in ten years?" or "What kind of a future do you think you have with our company?" Such directed questions,

aimed at a subject because of test indication, will establish the facts.

There is no question but what the interview board and the testing program compliment one another. The interview is essentially a significant corollary to the testing procedure. It is indeed a part of the test. From the actual written test comes the indication. From the interview, the verbal test, come the facts.

BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS

Not to be neglected in any discussion of personnel selection through testing is the background investigation. While the scope of this article will not permit an elaborate discussion of this method of selection, suffice it to say that this also is a vital part of the testing program.

When combined with the interview board and the written tests designed to indicate intelligence, personality and interest, the background investigation provides a further insight into the problem of selecting plant protection officers and security guards.

The background investigation, while being a valuable source of accurate information, is also extremely expensive. It is, in fact, prohibitive in most cases.

In evaluating positions, a determination must be made as to whether or not the position open would warrant an extensive investigation of an individual's background.

THE POLYGRAPH TEST

Gaining in popularity among security people across the nation is the polygraph test or, as it is popularly called, the lie detector examination.

As a screening device, this instrument, used to determine whether or not a person is lying, may or may not be useful. Most experts would agree that the instrument is only as good as its operator. The experts would not, however, agree on what qualifies an operator to use the instrument. As long as confusion exists on this point, the security director will have to decide for himself whether or not he will use the lie detector as a selection test.

Written tests, oral interviews and background investigations are all accepted universally as employment screening devices. The lie detector is not. If used, based on the confusion that exists in the field, it should never be used as a final determination, but rather, only as an indication.

This article has attempted to set forth a *rationale* for the establishment of an adequate company testing program for plant protection officers and security guards. Through testing, a company may become more certain, although never positive, that it is hiring the best possible man available for a position that in many cases has heretofore been filled without sufficient reflective consideration of the possibilities an adequate testing program can provide.



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Captain Abo (Continued)

Department of Defense to fix responsibility for the unauthorized disclosure of classified information. A number of recommendations were made by this committee, two of which had direct application to the Bureau of Aeronautics. Specifically, these recommendations were: (1) Recommend that a determined attack be made on overclassification. This should be spear-headed by responsible heads within the Department of Defense, from the Secretary of Defense down, registering a keen interest in information security. (2) Extend the use of Classification Guides, now existing in several technical fields, to other areas, and supplement the regulations covering general classification by developing guidelines and listing typical examples for each category of classification.

It is with these recommendations in mind, coupled with the obvious fact that once we have classified Bureau of Aeronautics information, that we must then inform everyone concerned of this classification and not just the contractor involved. This classification must be current and must be made available to contractors, supply activities, users of the equipment and overhaul activities. This applies not only to activities of the Navy, but to the activities of the other services and agencies of the Executive Branch of the Government who have access to Bureau of Aeronautics classified information. Under present regulations, this notification is accomplished initially by means of the Department of Defense Form DD-254, which is essentially a standard list of sixty-three elements describing a contract and indicating the *individual classification assigned by the Department of Defense to each of these elements*. I would like to stress here, that this classification list is made available initially only to the contractor and the cognizant security office.

All but five of these elements listed in the DD-254 are media, such as drawings, sketches or photographs, end item produced, specifications, models, mock-ups, and contract generated reports and publications. It must be borne in mind here that these media elements, which are assigned a classification by the Department of Defense, are items that can *convey* information.

It follows then that these DD-254 elements, in which classification is pre-determined by the Department of Defense, may actually not contain classified information when generated by the contractor. Even if classified, it may well be that they should have been marked with a lower or even higher classification. This, then, is one weakness in this system of classifying by media. Another weakness to this method of classifying is that there are no definitions or guidelines to clearly define what these elements are, for example, what is the definition of a "substantially complete set of drawings," or "contractor generated report?"

This system of classifying by media, or classifying the whole end item, such as an aircraft, was, to a

degree, manageable in the period prior to and during World War II. Essentially this was true, because military equipment had not expanded into as many fields or into such a volume as it has today. For example, during World War II and afterward, we developed such things as radar, electronic equipment, guided missiles, jet engines, jet aircraft, infra-red devices, atomic weapons, atomic power, space vehicles, liquid and solid propellants, etc. If you recall, before World War II we had none of these things in common use, so we did not have such a volume or variety of technical information and equipment to classify or to control.

As pointed out before, this method of classifying the contract, or end item did not provide any guidelines or information as to what it was about the end item or contract that required it to be classified. Let's take an example. A new aircraft is classified Secret. The contractor then would be obligated to mark Secret *everything* generated in his fulfillment of this classified contract. For example, all drawings of the aircraft would have to be marked Secret; all inspection reports, technical reports, engineering notes, etc., would also have to be marked Secret. Realizing this, the Department of Defense, in about 1951, did an excellent job in developing the DD-254 Form, which broke down each contract end item into this list of sixty three descriptive elements. The fact that the Department of Defense was able to break away from the age-old policy of assigning an over-all classification to an end item or contract was indeed a most desirable step in the right direction. This current breakdown of a classified contract or end item was accomplished by establishing seven major groupings of media, namely (1) description of the contract end item, (2) production and procurement information, (3) drawings, (4) models, (5) contractor generated reports, (6) publications, and (7) performance information.

The current instructions governing the use of this new form allows some leeway for the cognizant security officer in identifying and establishing classified information as it is generated and I quote from the Armed Forces Industrial Security Regulation, "It is intended that this form will eliminate the misconception that a security classification assigned to a classified contract or task applies equally to all phases of such contractor task, and thus will prevent the impairment of production schedules which might otherwise be caused by unnecessary clearance and safeguarding requirements." This relief from the assigned classification, however, does not apply to contractor personnel directly, so it is not very useful to them.

The Bureau of Aeronautics, realizing that the present form still was not specific enough to be useful to contractors as well as others, broke down the original sixty-three elements into a total of one hundred and eighty-two detailed elements. For example, fixed equipment in an aircraft was broken down into such

elements as flight control systems, hydraulic systems, communication systems, anti-icing systems, air-conditioning systems and so forth. Actually, this method of identifying the components of an end item can be broken down still further until there would be a classification applied to every single item which make up the entire equipment, be it a piece of metal, wire or a nut and bolt. This, of course, is not a practical approach, because it would be a monumental task to attempt to identify each individual item, let alone give each a classification. Realizing this, the Bureau of Aeronautics, after a long and thorough study of the problem, dropped this method of classification and adopted the system of classifying *information only*.

There are only five items on the DD-254 Form which are information and not media, and they are, Items 10g, 11a, 11b, 15 and 19b, which are entitled respec-

aways, mock-ups, handbooks, contract documents, etc.

As a result of this study of the DD-254 Form, we in the Bureau of Aeronautics have come to the conclusion that in almost all instances, only certain *performance information* should be classified by the Department of Defense. It is this *information* about military equipment that is of vital importance to our potential enemies. It is performance information about our weapon systems that determines what our potential enemies will do to counter our capabilities.

Using this as a basis for our thinking, and to carry out the intent of the DD-254 and Executive Order 10501, the Bureau of Aeronautics developed a standard list of twenty clearly identifiable items of performance information which are applicable to almost all of our contracts and equipment. These items consist of such things as range limitations, vulnerability to coun-



Mr. A. Tyler Port honored the San Diego chapter by appearing, as guest speaker at the Kona Kai Club, San Diego, February 13, 1959. Some of the ninety two persons in attendance were: Left to Right: Douglas Dye, Office of Security Policy—D.O.D.; Ross Miller, Corporate Director of Industrial Security—North American Aviation, Inc. Director—A.S.I.S.; George Thompson, Director of Industrial Security—North American Aviation, Inc., Los Angeles Division, Vice President, Western Region—A.S.I.S.; Leslie Gehres, Manager of Employee Relations and Security—Ryan Aeronautical Co., Vice Chairman—San Diego Chapter, A.S.I.S.; A. Tyler Port, Director—Office of Security Policy—D.O.D.; John L. Buckley, Director of Security—Varian Associates, First Vice President—A.S.I.S.; Richard J. Healy, Assistant Director of Industrial Relations—Thompson, Ramo-Wooldridge, Inc., President—A.S.I.S.; George D. Higgins, Jr., Corporate Director of Industrial Security—Convair, A Division of General Dynamics Corporation, Chairman—San Diego Chapter, A.S.I.S.

tively (1) "identifying description of purpose," (2) "production information," (3) "procurement information," (4) "design information," and (5) "military performance or operating characteristics." In the final analysis, these, of course, are actually the basic reasons why any Department of Defense procurement is classified. To us in the bureau, Item 19b is the most important item on the DD-254 Form. This specific item, however, needs to be clarified in that it does not spell out clearly just what the military performance and operating characteristics are. Without guidelines and to play it safe, everyone, especially contractors fulfilling a classified contract, obviously will classify everything generated by a contract that has anything remotely connected with performance information. It is this *one item of information* that has direct application to almost all of the other media items on the present DD-254 Form, in that this type of information may be conveyed by such means as drawings, sketches, cut-

termeasures, altitude limitations, accuracy, specific thrust, speed limits and restrictions, etc. It is this information then that makes classification of all the remaining DD-254 Form elements mandatory, but *only if this type of information is revealed*.

The Bureau of Aeronautics has been using this standard DD-254 Form with performance information clearly defined for some months now and have been receiving favorable comments from Industry on it. As far as Bureau of Aeronautics contracts are concerned, the contractor can now determine proper classification and marking of contractor generated documents and equipment as it is being produced and not marked as pre-determined by the Bureau of Aeronautics.

As mentioned before, and as is true of all services, the Bureau of Aeronautics classified information and equipment is in the hands of the Department of De-

(Continued on next page)

Captain Abo (Continued)

fense (1) Operational Forces, (2) Overhaul Shops, (3) Supply Depots, and (4) United States Industrial Firms, and other agencies of the Executive Branch of the Government. We all realize that this is a wide dissemination of classified information and equipment, and as time passes, the accountability as to actually where this classified information or equipment is at any given time is a tremendous undertaking. It is with this thought in mind that the Bureau of Aeronautics has discarded the idea of trying to inform all of these field activities by individual letter of declassification or regrading actions. We are now informing *all possible holders* of Bureau of Aeronautics classified information and equipment of their current classification.

This is accomplished through the issuance of the Bureau of Aeronautics Classification Guide (NavAer 00-25-545), which lists all Bureau of Aeronautics contracts and equipments along with their up-to-date classification. This notification of up-to-date classification is accomplished through the use of a Master DD-254 used in the guide. This Master List is the standard DD-254 which includes the additional twenty items of performance information. By the use of this list, any one of the previously mentioned activities, especially contractors, can now determine the current classification of any Bureau of Aeronautics equipment or contract. Those concerned can also determine what information it is that requires it to be classified.

Changes to this guide are issued semi-annually, however, the Contractor and Cognizant Security Officer are notified immediately of all changes in classification of contract elements in a specific contract by a form letter. This eliminates the requirement to prepare a whole new DD-254 if the classification of only one or a few elements is changed. Not only does this system of control cut down overclassification and needless costly protective measures, but it also cuts down needless derivative classification in the field because the classified information is now clearly identified.

In addition, by use of this Classification Guide, anyone having custody of Bureau of Aeronautics classified information or equipment can determine the up-to-date classification or can take regrading action on any Bureau of Aeronautics equipment or contract simply by preparing an up-to-date DD-254 Form, based on the Master DD-254 in the Guide. This is done by simply looking up the nomenclature of the equipment or contract number listed in the Classification Guide and applying the classification category key assigned to the specific equipment or contract to the Master DD-254 list in the guide. The Master DD-254 provides for seven classification categories or phases through which a contract normally progresses, that is, from research and development stage through various stages of production and use. The highest classifications, of

course, are required in the research and development category or phase. Eventually, after the equipment has been in use for a certain number of years, it may be placed in the last or unclassified category.

The wide dissemination of the Classification Guide enables the Bureau of Aeronautics to put reclassification and declassification on a practical and expeditious basis regardless of where and in whose hands the equipment or information may be. This system of notification of current classification is extremely useful to the prime contractors and is especially useful in issuing sub-contract DD-254's which can, in many cases, be accomplished with a minimum of classified information involved, thus saving *time and money*. It is useful to supply activities which handle this classified equipment, for they can clearly identify what elements are classified about the equipment they handle. It is especially useful to overhaul activities for they need only to protect those elements of a piece of equipment that reveals classified information, thus eliminating a tremendous amount of needless and costly protection of equipment elements which actually reveal no classified information. It is invaluable to the user, for whom the equipment was developed, for he has up-to-date guidelines as to what it is about the particular equipment that is classified and what the *current* classification is. And finally, this system of clearly identifying the specific information that is classified about contracts or equipment will lessen to a great degree the chance of inadvertent oral disclosure by persons having access to such equipment or information. Heretofore, persons having access were not informed of what was classified about a contract or equipment, and, therefore, could unknowingly disclose, orally or otherwise, *the very information* about the contract or equipment that required protection.

As a final observation, one important peculiarity about classified information is that the regrading of this information is undoubtedly one of the most tedious tasks in the whole business of administering a Security Classification Program. On the other hand, it isn't a tedious task to classify, for there is no work involved for the classifier. Not only that, classification has a certain egotistical appeal. Generally speaking then, more thinking and work should go into the process of applying an original classification.

In this regard, the Bureau of Aeronautics has recently implemented a classification program which makes initial classification a little harder. The engineer must now, before marking a piece of equipment or contract classified, identify and record the classification information itself. It follows then that regrading action is made much less tedious in that only this specific and identified information need be considered in a regrading action. This new method is also especially helpful in regrading of derivative classification.

As a result of this reorientation in the classification processes, tremendous savings in *time* and *money* can be realized by everyone concerned by proper and timely application of the Bureau of Aeronautics Classification Guide. It is not only a saving in time and money, but our whole security program will be strengthened by cutting *overclassification to a minimum*. It is overclassification that detracts from the importance of classification in the minds of all personnel, thus undermining our security. Lt. General Arthur G. Trudeau, the Chief of Army Research and Development, recently indicated a need for better security in a speech, and I quote, "the advanced state of Soviet technology today is due more to Soviet success in espionage than to their scientific apparatus, good as it is."

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Security Problems (Continued)

course of its production. Such complexities inevitable mean loopholes to be plugged by adequate security measures.

The psychological film-security problems are no less important or troublesome. The mechanics of taking and making "movies" are relative mysteries to many people. Moreover, the rapidly expanding use of film means that many relatively inexperienced people are involved in the production of the film used to record scientific events. The lack of a full understanding of what happens to film after it is passed through the camera can lead to carelessness that vastly complicates subsequent security measures.

The fundamental objective of all film-security measures is, of course, to prevent *any* exposed film (even as much as a part of one frame) from getting into the hands of *any* unauthorized person, at *any* time. This requires not only careful procedures for identifying and handling complete reels and cans, but precise methods for positively accounting for every frame of film, from exposure to developing and printing, through editing, to final release prints.

The suggestions which follow certainly do not represent a comprehensive system for achieving complete security. They cover merely a few of the areas which we have found to be most sensitive. We hope that they will serve as useful starting points for planning of your film-security measures.

Some thoughts for film supervisors

The actions taken when film is purchased, loaded, and exposed determine the nature and complexity of the security problems that will follow through processing, editing and printings. It is important to note that there are two separate security functions that take place between the original exposure and the finished print. As a rule, the exposed film requires only development and the printing of a "work print". This developed negative and the work print are then returned to the contractor intact. It is relatively simple to enforce effective security during this phase. It becomes enormously more difficult to ensure good security during the phases which follow. These include editing, special effects, opticals (fades and dissolves), negative cutting and final prints. At Consolidated Film Industries, interdepartmental transfer of classified film by any laboratory personnel is strictly prohibited. This function can only be performed by Security Control. The astute supervisor is, we know, vitally interested in understanding this total film-handling process, in order to achieve maximum total economy and efficiency. Here are a few points that originators of classified film might find worthwhile considering, in the interests of maximum security for their projects:

Types of film

The improper selection of film can create almost insurmountable obstacles to maximum security; pre-planning is very important. In shooting any classified footage, commercial-type (or professional-type) film should be used, rather than amateur film. Commercial film has sequential key numbers or code numbers superimposed on the film edge (outside the sprocket holes) every foot (16 frames on 35 mm, 40 frames on 16 mm film). These numbers remain on the developed negative, and show on all prints, providing for quick, accurate measurement of exact lengths of film being handled, and allowing ready detection of missing frames.

Embossing

Film producers and processors frequently encounter troublesome discrepancies between approximate footage indicated as delivered to a laboratory, and the exact, measured footage of developed film returned. The simplest solution to this problem, and one considered acceptable from a security point of view, lies in the use of an embossing stamp (or other equivalent, unambiguous markings) at the start and finish of each reel of film, at the time of exposure.

The person responsible for loading the magazine embosses the leader prior to loading the camera. The cameraman, after having shot all but the normal 3-to-6 foot trailer at the end of the reel, spools out that footage (thereby completely exposing it) and embosses the trailing end.

With start and finish clearly indicated by coded embossing, and key numbers in between, there can be no question about the exact length of film involved.

A uniform adoption of such a practice would be an invaluable contribution toward improvement of security in this sensitive area.

Recommendations for film processing laboratories

It should be noted at the outset that classified film, as yet, constitutes a very small percentage of the total footage processed in any large laboratory. CFI, nevertheless, maintains a complete security-control staff.

A carefully developed, comprehensive film-handling security system has contributed significantly to CFI's successful processing of millions of feet of classified film. In brief, the following are some of the more important procedures, developed through long experience, which help CFI maintain maximum product quality under maximum security conditions: *Incoming film* — All classified film is received and recorded in the CFI Security Office. A "Classified Film Record" form and color-coded containers are prepared to accompany the film at all times throughout the processing procedure. A complete history of the film, including signatures of everyone who han-

dles it, will be recorded in the "Classified Film Record". The film is delivered to the first applicable department by a security officer, and signed for. Each departmental supervisor is held completely responsible for the film during the time it is under his jurisdiction. It is he who assigns specific properly cleared personnel to the job of handling the film in his department. Immediately on completion of the department's work, the security office is notified that the film is ready to be transferred. In each case, an interdepartmental film transfer is the responsibility of security control.

Outgoing film — The completed film is either delivered to the customer by a security courier or is prepared for shipment by security control. This rule is inviolate: there is no allowance for any contrary independent action.

Storage — Classified film must at all times be under the observation of cleared personnel or locked in a secure temporary storage container provided for that purpose.

Area control system — A series of electrical locking devices is employed on the doorways between departments. Coded cards, keyed to specific locks, are issued to authorized personnel, and are strictly non-trans-

ferable. The card, when inserted in a slotted plate, trips the lock mechanism, permitting entry.

In support of this area control system, the area supervisor is responsible for the complete compliance of company procedures regarding admission to the area.

Subcontractor transmittal procedure — When any work is contracted for outside of the company, a "Subcontractor's Transmittal Receipt" form is filled out and accompanies all classified film. This form shows the approximate footage, as given by the prime contractor, of the undeveloped negative. When the film is returned, the subcontractor is obliged to fill in the *exact* billage footage. This figure is then carefully checked at CFI by precise mechanical accounting procedures, and any discrepancies must be justified by the subcontractor.

Identification — The containers for all classified material are color-coded or specially marked. This procedure immediately identifies the area as one in which classified work is being done.

Each roll of film carries its own identifying number (ideally, the contractor should clearly label every roll with project and roll number at the time of

(Continued on next page)

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Security Problems (Continued)

shooting), and every individual who handles that container or film must sign for it. Thus, the complete history of every frame of classified film is known from the moment the laboratory signs for it until it is delivered back into the hands of the contractor. *Conservation*:- Naturally, if we are required to do any editing, splicing, or other cutting, a detailed record is kept of every operation, and every scrap of film is saved and returned. In fact, it is recommended that doormats be used at the exit from the cutting room so that, should pieces of film adhere to shoe-bottoms, they will be removed before the wearer leaves the area.

These procedures have all been thoroughly time-tested and found to be effective. CFI pioneered in the development of some of the above basic procedures, and recommends them for consideration by others.

Summary — With the use of film in classified sci-

tific work growing rapidly the industry must move quickly to evolve and adopt reliable, efficient security measures. When specific governmental regulations are developed by a group of representatives of the Department of Defense and qualified Security personnel of the Motion Picture Industry, spelling out a precise schedule of procedures, it will not only eliminate existing danger areas, but will give to those organizations dealing with classified film a firm, industry-wide basis on which to build their own security control system.

Motion Picture film should be removed from the "Graphic Arts" section under which it is presently assigned in the Industrial Security Manual, and be recognized as a specialized industry requirement, and as such should be separately treated in the attachment to the security agreement.

We at CFI hope that, by sharing our experiences, and by helping in the development of sound regulations, the over-all progress of our nation's defense effort will be materially aided.

"Security Meets the Engineer"

Taking a cue from "58" convention theme, "The Scientists, the Engineer, and Security," the Northern California chapter put it into practice by appearing before the management section of the Institute of Radio Engineers (IRE) in Palo Alto, California.

A panel consisting of four ASIS members, Bob Love, Bert Inman, Dave Picher, Ray Rasmussen and moderated by Tom O'Neill, presented graphically with the use of the view graf, "The Impact of Industrial Security on Management."

Setting up a hypothetical contractor's plant, Bob Love outlined problems encountered by a company when they perform on a government classified contract. Dave Picher followed by describing the management problems in setting up a good security program. Bert Inman then outlined the cost to management. Finally, Ray Rasmussen of Headquarters 6th U. S. Army, outlined the activities of the military security cognizant agency. Tom O'Neill summarized and asked for questions from the floor.

The questions were many and varied, and indicated a keen interest on the part of the technical people in attendance. An audience of seventy two people agreed that the session was outstanding and suggested further meetings. Toward this end the Northern California chapter of ASIS plans to meet with other technical and professional groups throughout the area.

National 1st vice president Jack Buckley introduced president Dick Healy, who came up from Los Angeles

for the meeting. Dick outlined the activities of ASIS and invited the Engineers to write to us about any security questions that might arise, assuming of course, they did not have a professional security officer in their own plant. It is suggested, other chapters thru out the nation might wish to use this technique.



Above are participants in the joint A.S.I.S.-I.R.E. Management Seminar. L. to R.: John L. Buckley, First Vice President, A.S.I.S., Varian Associates; David L. Picher, Lockheed Missiles and Space Division; Al Dunbar, Chairman, I.R.E. Management Group; Richard J. Healy, President, A.S.I.S., Thompson-Ramo-Wooldridge; Thomas J. O'Neill, Stanford Research Institute.

Fire Consciousness (Continued)

havior of the employee in the plant from unsafe behavior and actions to safe actions and behavior. Therefore, let us now attempt to determine the manner in which employees affect the fire safety in any industrial plant.

First, the individual may become the critical factor in the fire situation, whereby his actions or lack of action creates a condition or conditions that enable a fire to occur. The important point in this situation is the individual's behavior in relation to the time sequence of fire ignition. The behavior is *always* before the fire ignition, and in many cases, the individual will not even be on the premises at the time of fire ignition or discovery. The time sequence involved may vary from a few seconds to a period of as long as days, weeks or even months. Let us now take a hypothetical example. An employee upon leaving the plant after work, places his paint saturated overalls in the bottom of his locker. Several hours later, due to the process of spontaneous ignition, a fire occurs in the locker. The "cause" of the fire is of course listed as "spontaneous ignition". However, the individual *created* the situation conducive to the spontaneous ignition and the resulting fire. This is what is meant when we say the employee in your plant is the critical factor in the fire situation. He is the responsible factor for the fire ignition — the direct and the indirect factor behind the fire cause. Let us now examine some actual cases from the National Fire Protection Association Occupancy Fire Records, which clarify the role of the employee in the fire situation.

Case I — Department State, Washington, D. C. — November 22, 1949 — \$130,000 loss. Employee smoking was the cause of the fire originating in the second floor shipping room. The management had been previously warned about the hazard of employee smoking in this area, but had been unable to control it.

Case II — Truck Terminal, Lowell, Massachusetts — June 5, 1948 — \$356,000 loss. Investigation as to the cause of this fire which originated in the ceiling area disclosed 30 ampere fuses in the light circuits designed for 15 ampere fuses.

These reports are representative of many others which we could cite from the records, and the reports I am sure everyone of you can cite from your own personal experience. From this information it is not difficult to deduce the actions of an employee which initiated the factors conducive to the ignition of the fire.

The second manner in which employees may affect the fire safety and security of your industry occurs when the individual becomes the critical factor in the failure or mal-function of your fire protection, procedure or equipment. Generally, this action of the employee follows in the time sequence the actual

ignition of the fire. We are all familiar with examples where an employee has acted in a detrimental manner to cause the failure of the fire protection equipment. Cases may be cited where employees failed to sound the fire alarm, fought the fire with extinguishers before sounding the alarm, turned off sprinkler or standpipe control valves before the fire was out, and even instances in which employees ignored an outbreak of fire. Once again, referring to the Occupancy Fire Records of the National Fire Protection Association, I would like to cite two cases where the individual employee was the critical factor in the failure of a fire to be contained, confined, and extinguished.

Case III — Foundry, Alexandria, Virginia — April 22, 1953 — \$305,000 loss. Employees fought the fire in wood columns ignited by sparks from a melting furnace with soda & acid fire extinguishers, and did not immediately call the fire department. The fire spread through three interconnected buildings.

Case IV — Truck Terminal, Cleveland, Ohio — February 6, 1949 — \$554,000 loss. Fire started at an oil-fired space heater. Employees used 7 foam type fire extinguishers on the blaze before calling the fire department.

It is evident that in some cases the actions of employees may lead to the failure of the fire protection efforts and equipment because of actions prior to the actual fire ignition as well as after the fire ignition. The closing of sprinkler valves, the piling of stock to obstruct sprinkler water distribution, the obstruction of fire doors, the obstruction and removal of fire protection equipment, are all examples of employee actions that will directly influence the severity of fire damage.

From the previous examples and discussion it appears that the actions of the employees in an industrial plant may be analyzed into the pre-ignition behavior, and the post-ignition behavior on a time continuum. The pre-ignition behavior includes the actions of the individual that are conducive to, and are directly responsible for the fire ignition, and the actions that are conducive to the failure of control operations on the fire. The post-ignition behavior includes the actions that are conducive to the failure of the control operations on the fire and behavior that directly or indirectly facilitates the fire spread. Now, we can all see that if we eliminate the actions and behavior of the individual in both the pre-ignition and the post-ignition situations that are conducive to the initiation and spread of a fire, we have won a major portion of our battle for a fire safe industrial environment.

We have developed this tentative analysis of the pre-ignition and the post-ignition fire situation in relation to the behavior of the individual, in an attempt to clarify the relationship between the be-

(Continued on next page)

Fire Consciousness (Continued)

havior of the individual employee, the occurrence of the fire and the severity of the fire. Let us now examine how the concept of "Fire Consciousness" influences the behavior of the individual employee. Earlier in this paper you will remember that we defined "Fire Consciousness, as the attitude or awareness of the danger and threat of fire as related to the individual employee". Therefore, the central topic of this presentation, "Developing Employee Fire Consciousness" must be examined in the light of the factors that affect the behavior of the individual in both the pre-ignition and the post-ignition fire situations. We must develop procedures and methods that will insure that the behavior of the individual will at all times lead to conditions that are *NOT* conducive to the initiation of a fire, and will lead to conditions that are *NOT* detrimental to the control, confinement, and extinguishment of the fire.

We must accept the established scientific truth that all human behavior is caused, or is motivated. These motives may be conscious or unconscious, and may be primary or physical, and secondary or socially acquired. To modify human behavior, and this is our essential problem in attempting to develop fire consciousness, we must attempt to analyze the unsafe behavior to find the causes, the motives for this behavior. One crucial problem that hampers our understanding of the unsafe practices and behavior of individuals is our readiness to ascribe the motive for certain behavior to a pure description of the behavior. For example: An employee discards a cigarette into a wastebasket, starting a small fire. Thus, we say the fire was caused by careless smoking or carelessness. "*CARELESSNESS*" is just a description of the type of behavior, and not a cause or motive for the behavior.

We must always remember that what we are essentially searching for is the *WHY* for the behavior or the actions of the employee. "*CARELESSNESS*" is not an answer to the *WHY* for the behavior but is merely a description, and not a very accurate description of the behavior. The cause for the behavior of any individual is a result of the motives of the individual, the situation in which the individual is interacting, and the social pressures and forces operating upon the individual at that moment. Consider now some of the factors that affect the actions of the individual employee, and thus some of the factors that we must consider in any program to develop "Fire Consciousness".

PERCEPTION — FRAME OF REFERENCE: Perception involves the manner in which the individual orients his action or behavior — the way in which he sees things, the meaning he attaches to objects, symbols and occurrences. A case illustrating the im-

tance of perception as related to "fire consciousness" would be the example that occurred in Ogden, Utah on June 6, 1952. In this situation a cannery warehouse, sorting building and electrical substation were destroyed for a total loss of \$218,600. Several employees noticed a small grass fire near the cannery warehouse but failed to take any action until the blaze had involved outside wooden pallets stored 15 feet high, and was entering the warehouse. There is no doubt that these employees saw this fire, however, the small grass fire was not perceived as being threatening, or dangerous. The proper fire safe orientation or fire consciousness was absent and thus the small grass fire did not have the same meaning or significance to them, that it would have had to one who had developed a keen sense of "Fire Consciousness".

SOCIAL PRESSURE is the manner in which the expressions, actions, and behavior of other persons influences our actions and behavior. The manner in which our behavior is reinforced and thus established as a pattern of action, by the approval of the group. This factor reflects the importance of total participation in your fire safety programs by the entire industrial plant, including management.

SECURITY — The motive of security has many implications and manifestations in the everyday living of the individual employee. The motive of security from physical injury may be employed in developing "Fire Consciousness" with most employees. However some individuals due to personality and constitutional factors have developed stronger motives of security for their family, loved ones, or even possessions than for their own safety. There is even some evidence that we have employees who deliberately engage in practices conducive to fires and accidents due to the enhanced prestige and status this affords them with their group. The fellow who has built up the reputation of "Being afraid of nothing" is an example of this type of behavior in some groups. There are also those individuals in our plants who unconsciously enjoy being injured, due to the increased attention, sympathy and special privileges this behavior affords them.

The motive of security and protection from a threatening situation, force, or object is usually strongest in those persons most directly involved and exposed to the threat. A recent study in a government installation engaged in research on biological warfare agents showed that the personnel actually employed in the laboratories where the chance of exposure was greatest, were the most concerned with the safety precautions and procedures. While the personnel engaged in the supervisory, and administrative duties removed from the laboratories were more concerned with the problems of production, absences, and work efficiency.

This factor of security should be involved in any program related to "Fire Consciousness", and must be developed in very specific terms to apply to every individual employee within the industrial plant. Certain themes of this factor must be stressed at the appropriate time, it must be meaningful to the employee. For example — planning a part of your program to emphasize the loss of his job to the employee if the plant burns during a condition of high employment such as occurred during the period of World War II, is wasted effort. However, emphasizing the defense implications of the loss of the plant during the same period is more effective due to the concern for family and relatives serving in the Armed Forces.

I would like to try and clarify some of the points previously made, and to summarize this tentative formulation of the concept of "Fire Consciousness" as it relates to the industrial employee. First, since we visualize fire consciousness as an attitude, an awareness that we hope will affect and predispose behavior to a safe conclusion, I am not at all sure that we can develop, cultivate, or stimulate this awareness in all of our industrial employees. We


are attempting to modify the behavior of human organisms in an industrial environment, which is a very complex situation involving the interaction of many, many factors at any given moment.

Therefore, we must realize that there is a small percentage of individual employees in any industrial plant that will be "untouchable" in respect to any program we initiate to develop "Fire Consciousness". The important thing to remember about such a program is the fact that your primary objective and purpose is the individual employee. Your concern is not with fire loss statistics, chemical reactions or mathematical formulas, but with human individuals.

A program to develop "Fire Consciousness", since its primary objective is the employee in the plant, must be developed as an educational program, on a level of understanding for the employee, and in the language, symbols, and motives that are meaningful to the employee. The program must be developed to suit the particular and unique problems of your individual industrial plant. Therefore, I can not give you a cook book type of program, outlining helpful hints to be applied in your plant, and

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Fire Consciousness (Continued)

guarantee by following this recipe you will develop "Fire Consciousness" in your employees. In fact, I am not sure how I would apply such a program in many industrial plants without intensive study of the factors of communication, morale, group facilitation and prestige that operate within the industrial environment.

I sincerely hope that this discussion has created some interest for you to analyze and study the critical position the individual employee occupies in relation to your fire prevention and fire protection efforts. Remember, every puzzle has a key, every problem has a solution, every question has an answer. The individual employee in your plant is the KEY to a **FIRE SAFE** industrial environment.

From left to right standing, President Richard J. Healy is introduced by South-East Regional Vice President, Robert D. McCutcheon, at a Washington Chapter meeting on December 17, 1958, on the occasion of Mr. Healy's visit through a portion of the South-East Region.



Propaganda and Security (Continued)

pily, susceptible to approach if only the proper technique be employed.

THE CONCEPT OF SECURITY INDOCTRINATION

One of the fundamental errors we make in constructing employee security information programs is to think of them as "Security Education." Note, I have no objection to calling them that. For the average employee Security Education sounds less awesome than Security Indoctrination. The difficulty lies in the likelihood the security officer will come to convince himself that Security Education is what he really is concerned with and this should not be his true purpose.

Some distinctions and definitions will help to make this point clear. Education is generally accepted to mean discipline of the intellect or will through study and instruction. Inherent in this definition is the concept of preparing the student to make free and independent judgments, to accept and act on those ideas which his education has led him to conceive as good or true while rejecting those he perceives as false or bad. Now, while it is important that Americans share a common ideology in which patriotism, loyalty, civic prudence, and a sense of personal responsibility for national security are high in the scale of acceptable values; it is apparent that the industrial security pro-

gram cannot reasonably be expected to contribute in any significant way to the formation of such a social consciousness in even one employee—certainly not in the hundreds of thousands the programs are designed to reach. The industrial employee has already formed value judgment patterns by the time he applies for work. The early years at home, in school, and in the general community environment have set the broad outline of his adjustment to life. Subsequent experience can alter tendencies somewhat but only to the degree that such changes are made to appear desirable within the existing frame of reference. Yet it remains that some communication must be addressed to this mass audience so they know what their duties and obligations are as defense contractor employees. More important, such communications should play a material part not only in informing them but in producing specific actions.

The last phrase is the key to what we really mean when we talk about security education. It is a body of communications, planned and organized to accomplish predetermined objectives and addressed to a particular audience for the purpose of evoking responses favorable to those objectives. Said in another way it is any communication stimulus calculated to elicit specific actions or reactions from industrial employees which

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Propaganda and Security (Continued)

will further the security effort. Reference to any standard work on the subject will indicate that this definition is also a definition of propaganda.

The specific distinction between propaganda and education is that the former looks to concrete responses from its audience and is only collaterally interested in providing information or knowledge. A certain amount of information must necessarily be imparted but it is limited and defined by the desired response.

A propaganda campaign which achieves a high level of audience awareness but a low level of audience response has failed of its purpose. The information is important only in relation to the action. Education on the other hand imparts information and knowledge without concern for any specific student action. While measured in part by the total attitude through life of its students, an education is not said to fail if its products do not respond predictably in situations whose merits they have been prepared to evaluate rationally. A person is free to do the wrong or bad thing even though he knows it to be such. Further, different persons with the same education may disagree sharply on what is wrong or bad, for their education did not supply them with ready made labels to hang on future circumstances. It gave them rather, certain criteria for measuring circumstances, and application of even the same criteria by different people can produce startlingly inconsistent results.

If the purpose of Industrial Security Indoctrination be recognized and accepted by the security executive as identical to the purpose of any other propaganda effort, then a study of effective propaganda devices will enhance his future efforts. In this regard, a salient observation by one of the early leaders of the communist movement in Russia will be most helpful. (Incidentally we can learn a good deal about effective propaganda from them for they have used it on a greater scale and with more success than any political power in history.) George Valentinovitch Plekanhov has written that propaganda is the communication of many ideas to a few people and agitation is the repetition of a few ideas to many people. Although he later fell from grace after conflicts over revolutionary policy with Lenin, Plekanhov's distinction was to be the basis of the elaborate Communist Agit/Prop techniques which right up to today has jabbed at both Communist and non-Communist with telling results. Note the gradation—the larger the audience the simpler and more basic the message. What is missing in depth is made up for by repetition. As the audience sophistication level goes up the message becomes more complex until, at the pinnacle where the loyal, hard-core Communist Party members constitute a small, elite audience, the program encompasses the whole gamut of Party orthodoxy. This is a very important technique

for it is based on the principle that no more information than is essential for the desired conduct of a particular group should be included in a propaganda communication. More than the required minimum will not change the character of the action but may serve to confuse the audience and dilute their response. Reference to this principle will be made again in this study. The point to be emphasized here is that the amount or consistency of employee actions favorable to security objectives will not be proportional to or even directly measured by the amount of information furnished in indoctrination programs and that in some circumstances a large volume of information may produce improper or inadequate action.

THE METHOD OF SECURITY INDOCTRINATION

In a consideration of adapting security information programs to the methodology of propaganda there are four main headings under which the effort should be analyzed: Audience, Communication Form and Content, Media, and Effects.

AUDIENCE—The fact that all of us, however we may differ in environment, heredity and conditioning, have the same nature is the basis for the science of social psychology which has shown, that given values they consider important, any social group will seek to attain those values. Different groups will behave in different ways in the process but individuals in the same group will generally behave similarly. By social group is meant a body of people united to achieve some common purpose. Thus it is possible to predict with some accuracy the response pattern of a particular audience to a given stimulus if we know previous reactions of the same or similar groups to the same or similar stimuli. Note carefully that the definition of social group is very broad and can be applied, for example, to as large a group as a nation (which was Hitler's target for super-race propaganda) or as small a group as a high school class, a ladies bridge club or a company of infantry. The ingredient which converts a polyglot mass of individuals into a social group is common purpose. Mutual interest in the same objective will impart a unifying influence. The specific purpose or objective will determine the intensity of this influence and the logical areas in which communications will have group significance. This is true even where the common objective is considered evil by contemporary standards.

Another fact about social groups is that individual members will do things because of their group status that they would not do alone. A good example is a lynch mob. Moreover the attitude of one or two members can spread to others and produce a whole chain of reactions not otherwise probable, as for example, when several well placed hecklers stampede a meeting. This latter is a favorite trick of the Communists.

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Propaganda and Security (Continued)

Thus the social group has characteristics and exploitable vulnerabilities which are either not present or not identifiable in its individual members. The next concern is: By what devices or techniques can this group (which becomes the communicator's target audience) be made to react predictably? To answer this question recourse again is necessary to the findings of the social sciences. Psychology has determined that people are more likely to react to an emotional appeal than a rational one. The more elemental the emotion appealed to the more positive the reaction. Emotions in turn are conditioned on the basic fibres in our psycho-physical fabric—drives and needs. Drives are compelling urges which move every person irrespective of his status or environment. The drives for food, shelter, and other basic needs exist in all of us. However, because the requirements of security touch on a much higher plane of human consciousness there is no opportunity for direct exploitation of drives. The focus of effort will be needs. These vary from person to person and are largely created by the individual himself. A need is a conviction that the thing needed is indispensable for happiness or comfort. So we find needs for companionship, recognition or status, acceptance, power, etc. The emotions, while common in kind, become recessive or dominant, superordinate or subordinate in different people depending upon their needs. Love, hate, fear, envy, pride, and shame are found in all people but their intensity and objects vary with the needs of the individual. One person with an exaggerated need for status will tend to hate those who threaten it; such as business or political rivals, and envy those who possess it. The significant point is that most people will react in the same way to factors affecting their needs. In a target audience, the common purpose will create a hierarchy of common needs. A very broad common purpose will establish many common needs, a narrow purpose fewer. Hence, in dealing with a point central to the common purpose of any target audience we can expect common attitudes. These, in turn will produce common responses to pertinent stimuli. Thus it is that the communication can construct an effective program to achieve predictable mass response when he directs his message to the needs and related emotions of his target audience.

Knowing this, is but a first step for the security information specialist. It becomes his particular problem then to determine the identities and character of his target audiences. It must be remembered that a large or even a moderate sized industrial complex is peopled by many social groups within the all embracing common group we call the employee force. These sub-groups are built around special needs not common to employees outside the group. By way of illustration consider a multi-facility research, manufacturing and distributing organization. Of the total employee force

it is possible to identify a variety of social sub-groups such as the entire force at one facility as contrasted with their counterpart at a different facility, the laboratory staff, the sales organization, the bargaining unit and separate seniority units within it, or the executive committee and its immediate staff assistants. These are genuine, distinct target audiences because their members frequently live out daily business lives pivoted about needs peculiar to their group which may be isolated from or even considered hostile to other groups within the overall company structure. An appeal or campaign effective with one group because it is related to their needs may fail with another group in the same company because its needs are in conflict or opposition to the first group. Lest it be thought to avoid this problem of inter-group rivalry by keeping security indoctrination themes on the most basic level two additional factors must be evaluated. First, those themes which are suitable for producing action or reaction on a very broad scale are limited. While every employee has the responsibility of releasing classified data in his control only to those he knows are cleared and have a need to know, it is a much smaller group that will be concerned with say registration procedures, or classified reproduction or interpretation of a DD 254. Second, the more detailed or difficult the action desired, the more the appeal must relate to central needs. The common purpose and related needs of the larger groups are frequently less prominent in the lives of their members than those in the sub-groups. The rather flexible needs of an employee-as-such are frequently peripheral to his active business life, whereas the daily awareness of the needs of an engineer, or a salesman or a production control planner makes them epicentric and dominant. It is to satisfy these needs that he will make extra effort.

When the network of target audiences is clearly defined and their respective needs perceived in relationship to the specific actions or attitudes required for effective security operations the security manager is ready to consider his next item, the communications themselves.

COMMUNICATION FORM AND CONTENT—
The general area of form and content must be studied in the light of its included problems dealing with language, symbols, themes and internal consistency.

Language

Effective language is probably the single most important tool in the hands of any communicator whether he be concerned with raising funds for a church, recruiting enlistments for the military or convincing a housewife at the point-of-purchase to buy a particular detergent. As will be shown in a discussion of symbols further on, a great effects potential is to be found in non-verbal stimuli, however, it is language

which carries the major portion of a security indoctrination program because of the high ratio of desired action to new knowledge. Symbols are only suitable when their objects of reference are universally understood and familiar to the target audience. With industrial employees, particularly new employees, this familiarity is not fully developed, at least not in the early stages of the program.

Aware then that words and phrases will constitute the greater portion of his effort the security officer should appreciate the distinct phases through which his message induces audience action.

First the message must gain and hold target attention. A message not received is no message. Next it must be understood by the audience in the way in which the communicator intended it to be. Next, having perceived and understood it, the audience must accept the message. Finally passive acceptance must become active response. Thus we see four distinct steps —attention, comprehension, acceptance and response. Failure of the communication to pass successfully through all of these stages will deprive the security program of action effects. Each stage has its own pitfalls and requirements.

To gain and hold attention the security message must meet three tests. It must be distinctive enough

to set it apart from other communications, it must reach the target audience at a moment when there is time and opportunity to be aware of it, and it must not require any longer exposure than that probable with the least interested audience number. Varying circumstances will, of course, change the relative weight of these factors. For example, a one page security handout of three or four closely typed paragraphs might be suitable for distribution towards the end of a security training session or even at a coffee break. It would definitely not be appropriate for posting on a bulletin board near the time clock used by production workers to punch in or out.

Aware of the existence of a security communication, the audience is now prepared to seek its meaning. In achieving comprehension, the second requirement of communication, the earlier discussion of different audiences or groups with varying frames of reference has particular relevancy. In assuring that a communication shall be clear to an audience composed partly of unskilled workers whose reading level may be low or who may not be fluent in English, it is possible to create an unfavorable impression with professional or highly educated technical personnel in the same audience through the elite group's regard for the message as patronizing or even insulting. Thus, for any

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"Say you saw it in Industrial Security"

Propaganda and Security (Continued)

but the briefest, general themes security communications should be prepared for specific groups, couched in language appropriate to them and relevant to their particular needs. In speaking of "particular needs" reference is intended not to the specific security responsibilities of a group but to the more basic element of the common purpose which gives rise to needs independent of security but to which security can be necessarily related. For example, it may not impress a salesman to inform him that security regulations require clearance in advance for visits involving access to classified information. Aside from a presumed intent not to do anything positive to injure security there is no concrete motivating force which will consistently direct him to arrange visit clearance. But, show him that he will not complete a sales call, or that he will be less effective should he fail to attend to clearance requirements, and you have related security to his needs.

Attendees of the North Texas Chapter Seminar on Security Indoctrination held at Temco Aircraft Corporation, Garland, Texas, January 16, 1959.

Front row, left to right: D. A. Chesshir, Convair, Ft. Worth, Tex; LCDR R. Oddone, INSMAT, Dallas, Tex.; W. V. Walsh, Texas Instruments, Dallas Tex.; J. M. Traynor, BAR, Dallas, Tex.; J. B. Hall, Convair, Fort Worth Tex.; C. E. Collins, Bell Helicopter; Ft. Worth, Tex.; J. S. Davis, Temco, Garland, Tex.; Second row, left to right: W. B. Alderdice, Chance Vought, Dallas, Tex.; F. J. Conlon, Temco, Garland, Tex.; Maj. A. E. Sternberg, Carswell AFB, Tex.; H. D. Cockrell, Temco, Dallas, Tex.; J. C. Cunningham, Cont-EMSCO, Garland, Tex.; Ray Massey, AFPR, Convair, Ft. Worth, Tex.; S. O. Wester, APD, Dallas, Tex.; J. A. El-lington, Temco, Garland, Tex.



Should anyone observe here that this is not security consciousness in the pure sense but merely a desire to use security for personal convenience it must be remarked that not every aspect of the security program requires specific, conscious motivation. For many of the administrative purposes of the program it is sufficient that personnel merely do what is necessary. An attempt to emphasize altruism in situations where the greater implications of loyalty and personal responsibility obviously do not apply can bring ridicule and loss of prestige.

A further note on comprehension must be made concerning what is actually understood in reference to what was intended to be understood. We have all seen examples of business communications whose point is obscured by a welter of ill chosen words or poor sen-

tence structure. Even the presence (or absence) of prominence devices such as color, typography and page makeup in the printed medium or intonation, sound effects and volume in the aural medium can have a major effect on what is comprehended. By limiting each message to a few or even one theme, by using language appropriate to the audience, and by buttressing the point with suitable emphasis it is possible to avoid serious comprehension problems.

The whole idea can be expressed in one word—simplification! Even the most complex communication can be simplified if care is taken to break it down into separate meaning units. A classic example of dramatic simplification is Caesar's report to the Roman Senate—"I came, I saw, I conquered." Six words aptly summarizing a large scale military engagement. Of course precision of detail is sacrificed when the message becomes so terse as to be a slogan. However, an effective slogan has far greater mass appeal than a comprehen-

sive dissertation. Our objective in indoctrination is mass response and group action. In most instances the point will be just as well made because even given the detail, mass audiences will not absorb it. Moreover, when instinctive response is desired the cycle from attention to response must be short. "Zipper your lip or sink a ship," of World War II fame, was more effective than any explanation of enemy intelligence fragment collection would have been.

Symbols

Another aspect of Communication Form and Content which deserves mention is the use of symbols. We can regard a symbol as an abbreviated representation of meaning. To be useful, a symbol must be conventional, that is recognized for what it is and its real meaning understood by both the communicator and



his audience. Such a symbol can be tremendously powerful in achieving mass response. Recall the wide use of the symbol "V" in World War II. In its graphic form as the letter "V," in its aural form as the first four notes of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony (the same rhythmic phrasing as international morse code for letter "V"), in its action form as the index and middle fingers held aloft, this one symbol meant hope and sparked continued resistance among millions of people in different countries and of different languages. Our own flag is a symbol which conveys a whole history of meaning. The very words, "The American Flag," are emotionally explosive. What makes a symbol successful? It is simple and readily recognized, it has common meaning for its audience, and it refers to the deepest needs. Not every symbol will be as powerful or universal as these but even so, symbols can be found which have a real meaning for certain target audiences. One caution—it is not easy to create new symbols. Merely adopting an emblem or a poster character or some other device associated exclusively with the security program will not impart any special quality to it. Before a security symbol can be used to trigger specific actions, it will have to be associated in the minds of the target audience with the particular action required. This will be achieved only after frequent presentation of the symbol in context of the action. Thus the general highway traffic symbol for an intersecting road, the lateral "T," will cause an experienced motorist to expect an intersection, even before he can see it, and to take appropriate action. A person who has never driven or one not familiar with highway sign codes would not have any instinctive response. Thus a distinction is apparent in symbolism. A general symbol may be created as an attention device for security information purposes and may be successful in achieving rapid audience recognition. But action responses can be hoped for only from action-associated symbols and then only if the symbol is adequate by the criteria mentioned earlier.

Themes

We come now to a consideration of message acceptance. Having perceived and understood, the audience must now adopt the point, must be sympathetic or agreeable to what is said. It is at this stage that the persuasive quality of the communication is paramount. Audience rejection will not only preclude the desired action but may lead to obverse action. In this respect it is important to be aware that carefully planned security indoctrination campaigns will not attempt to make every message an action message. A certain amount of attitude conditioning is often a necessary preliminary. For example, assume the particular object of a certain campaign phase is to get more office workers to lock classified receptacles at break periods. The phase might begin with short messages (verbal or symbolic) showing that espionage

requires opportunity for access. Next might come some dramatic material on the damage possible from successful espionage of the type of information the particular target group is working with. Finally the action appeal to lock receptacles is appropriate. In the first message attention is focused on a subject of popular interest — espionage operations. No antagonisms are aroused as nothing is yet demanded of the audience and the material is credible. In the second message the emotion of fear and its underlying need, self-protection, are related to espionage. Together these messages will have a conditioning effect on the target in that fear of espionage consequences will generate a desire (possibly latent or unconscious) to avoid those consequences. In such a situation the attitude towards a suggested method will be one of acceptance. Hence the final message will furnish the answer to an inarticulate but real question. But why not present all three messages at once, say in a single poster? Because the cumulative effect of separate messages is greater than a single message, because separate presentation will tend to create a more favorable climate of reception by emphasizing a general need for action before introducing a specific action requirement, and because consecutive rather than simultaneous communications will preserve rapport between communicator and target audience over a longer period.

The final phase in the communication cycle, namely audience action, while actually a post-communication phenomenon is necessarily related to the motivating message. As was mentioned earlier, not every message will be action oriented. Many preliminary communications will be attention getters or attitude conditioners. However, incorrect or unclear action appeals can dissipate the potential response energy developed in earlier campaign phases. Hence action appeals should be: (1) specific, (2) within the power of the target, (3) require individual response and, (4) look to observable results. Contrast these two action appeals: "PRESERVE THE AMERICAN WAY", and "AMERICA'S STRENGTH IS IN BALLOTS NOT BULLETS — VOTE ON ELECTION DAY." In both appeals the audience is asked to do something for the good of America, this is clear from the imperative verbs "Preserve" and "Vote". But, in the first appeal the action is not specific (do what to preserve it?), it is not clearly within the power of the audience (who does it?), it does not stimulate individual response (what is expected of me?), and it does not aim at observable results (how do I know that I've done it?). Such a message though noble of sound is in reality sterile, it cannot produce specific response. The second appeal is quite different. Voting is specific, it is within the power of the audience, the individual must vote himself and the result is clearly observable, each member of the audience knows

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whether or not he has voted. Thus, while neither appeal *may* produce desired results because of other factors (inclement weather on election day, dull candidates, etc.) the first appeal *could not* have produced them even in the most favorable environment.

By way of summary then, security indoctrination communications should:

- (1) Be directed at specific audiences and related to their central needs;
- (2) Gain and hold attention through distinctiveness, brevity and proper timing;
- (3) Contain few themes and be cast in simple terms and understandable language;
- (4) Employ appropriate symbols with unequivocal meaning;
- (5) Persuade without appearing to compel;
- (6) Build in stages to reaction climaxes; and
- (7) Seek action responses which are specific, possible, individual and measurable.

A portion of the speaker's table during a North Texas Chapter meeting, January 16, 1959, at the Baker Hotel, Dallas, Texas. Left to right: George Anderson, Chairman Houston Chapter; Arthur Allen, Reg. Vice President; Richard J. Healy, President, ASIS; Albert T. Deere, Chairman Board of Directors, ASIS; John L. Buckley, First Vice President, ASIS; Richard E. Smith, Secretary, ASIS.



In respect to the whole question of communication form and content the industrial security expert would do well to enlist the help of others whose specialty is effective communication. The advertising or publicity departments can assist in presenting security indoctrination communications in a way designed to capture and move the audience. The industrial relations department or psychological testing service can help the security officer identify target groups and isolate their needs. It is not an admission of inadequacy but rather a positive effort to strengthen the program for the security expert to collaborate

with other experts whose respective fields he is not expected to have mastered.

MEDIA — Notwithstanding the new channels of communication which technological progress has developed over the past twenty years, the security information specialist is still fairly rigorously confined to the conventional media of film, print, and face-to-face contact. This is due primarily to the conditions under which a communication situation exists for industrial target audiences. Normally we can reach our audience only during working hours and at the place of employment. Thus, television and radio, media associated with leisure, are generally considered unavailable. This is not completely true and some imagination may locate fruitful possibilities not being exploited. Many plants broadcast continuous music to work forces because of the demonstrated relationship between music and efficiency. Such broadcasts usually emanate from one of two sources. Either the plant subscribes to a diffusion exchange utilizing multiplex FM channels and a central transmitter (Muzak, for example), or it uses

a record or tape machine and its own public address system. In both cases it is possible to interpolate brief security messages either by momentarily surpressing the exchange signal and introducing a message over the P/A system, or by including security messages in the pre-recorded material of local origin. An analogous practice, the radio spot commercial, has amply shown the potential benefit in such technique.

Consider another possibility. The most used accessory in a business office is probably the telephone.

The security office, being a hub of specialized activity, receives and places a large volume of in-plant calls. Might it not be profitable to use this opportunity for security messages? At first blush such an idea may sound ridiculous. Yet it does represent another possible channel and deserves serious research attention. The device is presently used by some sales and service organizations to enhance customer relations by furnishing the correct time or weather forecast and in a few instances a plain, unvarnished product plug.

There are several reasons why it is to our advantage to seek additional channels. First it increases exposure and adds to cumulative impression. Second some media reach captive audiences and do not depend on target selectivity. Thus, the use of the P/A system (an aural medium) for a brief reminder to store and lock classified material just before the end of the business day or shift hours will reach the target at precisely the opportune moment. Leaflets, posters and handbills (visual medium) might not have the same effect unless the audience chose to view them at that moment, an unlikely event. The same difficulty exists in reliance on recollection of past briefings or lectures.

These suggestions are in no way a disparagement of the more usual communication patterns. There is assuredly a need for continued use of the formal classroom approach for persons or groups having detailed responsibility for security administration. There is also a clear benefit from use of printed materials. Both these older techniques can still be greatly improved by a more consistent application of the scientific approach. What should be appreciated is that each medium has advantages peculiar to it which cannot be found in other media. The printed medium, while most suitable for complicated message, or when long retention is desired; does not have the dramatic impact of an aural medium in situations requiring immediate response without long term message retention. In cases where it is important that the audience acquire new manual skills the combination of audio-visual channels is most appropriate. In short, no single medium can be universally successful nor should the media be regarded as mutually exclusive. They are compatible and complementary.

EFFECTS — In treating this final point of our study an important distinction must be made. There is a difference between achieving communications effects and measuring the achievement of them. As a corollary it can be said that maximum effects will probably not be realized until we have devised methods for appraising them accurately because changes and modifications of technique can be meaningful only if based on known past results. Measurement techniques exist but it remains for these techniques to be adapted specifically to the needs of in-

dustrial security. Thus, we know that questionnaires, depth interviews, action response analyses and other data gathering mechanisms will supply information on communications effect. What is not yet known is how to relate these tools to our special situation. For example, should we measure results through sampling or should the entire target group be canvassed for results of a given campaign? If sampling is used what factors will affect the weight of sample distribution, or will random sampling produce representative results? How can controls be devised when security regulations require all employees to be made aware of their security responsibilities? More fundamental still, are we concerned with measuring attitude change and skill acquisition, as such, or will measurement of action responses give us enough insight?

As one step towards effect measurement the following suggestion is offered. As part of every security violation investigation, require the subject to describe as accurately as memory permits, every security message to which exposure is recollected which was relevant to the nature of the violation. Care is necessary that the response furnished be entirely the subject's and that prompting, leading questions or any other form of suggestion be avoided. A comparison of what the subject recalls with what the security organization records show were the actual communications for the same period may be helpful in identifying the most and least effective stimuli for that employee. To compensate for probable tendencies of subjects to exculpate themselves by admitting fewer exposures than actually recalled, one or two employees from the same target audience but not connected with the violation might be asked the same question. Proper tabulation and a growing body of data could point up strengths or weaknesses of effects throughout entire target audiences.

CONCLUSION

From even this cursory examination of the relationship between good security and effective communications it is apparent that many of our program objectives can best be accomplished through mass audience motivation, perhaps only in that fashion. This fact should spur further research and experimentation by individual security officers and by managements which take their security obligations seriously. A substantial portion of each security dollar goes to physical elements of the program. Locks, alarms, and guard force salaries admittedly are large expense items. But is it not true that in a free society conformity to accepted behaviour standards is largely a result of self-discipline? And is it not apparent that implicit in this proposition is a related proposition — people will more likely act on the basis of motivation than compulsion? The American

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security idea reflects this principle when it formulates clearance eligibility in terms of stable personality and good character reputation. An individual who can choose whether or not to abide by security requirements is the only type of person in whom instability or disloyalty pose a threat. In our system the individual is repeatedly placed in circumstances where such a choice is possible. The nature of the choice will depend almost exclusively on motivation. Surely a society which accepts daily attitude conditioning in such diverse applications as what to eat, read, ride to work in, shave with, and be entertained by, will not be heard to complain if those techniques are employed a bit more knowledgeably where national survival is the goal. It is definitely an important part of the security executive's responsibility to become more proficient in the science of motivation and the art of communication. More effort and resources must be expended in this development. It is, after all, an attempt to master the most potent security weapon available under a republican form of government.

THE AUTHOR:

Mr. Walsh recently joined the Sperry Gyroscope Co., after two years as Security Director for A. B. DuMont Labs., Inc.. In addition to his association with Sperry, Mr. Walsh is a Lecturer-Assistant Professor in Communication Arts at Fordham University where he conducts a graduate course in political propaganda. He has attempted in this paper to point up the value for industrial security officers of research results in communication effects. He has previously written for INDUSTRIAL SECURITY on, "The Function of the Security Director in Industry", and, "Public Information And Defense Contracts."



At a meeting of the Houston Chapter held on January 15, 1959, reading from left to right, George Anderson, Chairman, Houston Chapter, greets Chairman of the Board Albert T. Deere.

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James L. Western

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Speakers' table at the February 26, 1959, meeting of the Pittsburgh Chapter, held at Westinghouse Research Center, Churchill Borough, Pa., left to right, Lt. Thomas B. Mangus, Naval Security Officer, Dept. of Navy, Pittsburgh office; George W. Rittleman, Chapter Chairman, Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., Pittsburgh, Pa.; E. Hugo Winterrowd, Special Agent in Charge, Pittsburgh office, F.B.I.; Thomas P. Derdock, Chapter Secretary, Westinghouse Electric Corporation, East Pittsburgh, Pa.; J. C. Fleming, Director, Security Division, Pittsburgh Naval Reactors Operations Office, U. S. Atomic Energy Commission, Pittsburgh, Pa. Guest speakers were Mr. Winterrowd, and Lieut. Mangus.

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